

Case Study – July 2022

Enabling Powershifts: KALAHI in the Philippines as a Sandwich Strategy Case

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Introduction

The *Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan* - Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Service -National Community-Driven Development Program (KC-NCDDP or KALAH) is a national participatory poverty alleviation program of the Philippines. Since the program began in 2003, it has made remarkable achievements in addressing poverty, particularly in improving service delivery in the poorest barangays and in enabling communities to take part in local governance. Notably, the KALAH program adopted for the first time in the Philippines a community-driven development model that centered citizen participation in planning, budgeting and implementation of the project. This paper argues that this participatory structure, and, specifically, the 'sandwich strategy' dynamic of top-level support from actors in the Philippine government and the mobilization of civil society from below, was integral to the success of the program. Investigating KALAH as a sandwich strategy case study enriches the concept by illustrating a specific approach to the strategy, in which a national government agency took the lead in opening spaces for citizen participation in community-level local governance.

This paper further argues that KALAH brought about powershifts at the local level, particularly in the allocation of resources that were once dominated by mayors. It did so through top-level efforts facilitated by reformers in the government who were allies of progressive civil society groups and social movements. KALAH led to the mobilization and enabling of communities in identifying, implementing and monitoring projects. The project generated tangible benefits in local poverty alleviation and capacitated hundreds of community volunteers that now engage local governance. However, with lack of consolidation of community and civil society leaders at multiple scales and the threat of changes in the program that transfer facilitation roles to the local governments, the potentially transformative powershifts that were enabled by KALAH face the problems of sustainability and dilution.

Sandwich strategy refers to the

“attempt by pro-reform actors within government to drive institutional change by cultivating synergy with citizen action. The sandwich strategy relies on the mutually-reinforcing interaction between pro-reform actors in both state and society, not just initiatives from one or the other arena. The hypothesis is that openings from above that make possible mobilization from below by tangibly reducing the risks/costs of collective action can enable pro-accountability actors in both state and society. This approach transcends the conventional two-dimensional framework for understanding state-society relations, to identify state-society pro-reform coalitions that collaborate for change – possibly by engaging in conflict with anti-accountability coalitions that also bring together actors in state and society.” (ARC Guide paper)

The case starts with an overview of the socio-political context in the Philippines when KALAH was introduced. It is followed by a presentation of key state and international actors, an outline of KALAH's citizen engagement features, and its reform dynamics. Results and gains, as well as challenges and sustainability follow before a concluding analysis section.

Socio-Political Context Surrounding KALAHI

Despite the Philippines' notable development in recent years, inclusive development remains elusive. While the Philippine economy has been steadily growing, the country's poverty incidence remains high at twenty-one percent in 2018 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2019). That means over twenty-two million Filipinos earn less than PHP 60 or USD 1.20 per day. In some regions, like the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), poverty incidence is as high as sixty-three percent (Philippine Statistics Authority 2019). About forty-four percent of the rural population lives in poverty and around three-fourth of the poor population lives in rural areas (World Bank 2013). Furthermore, local government units (LGUs) in poor rural communities lack the resources to provide adequate services to their communities and lack opportunities to effectively engage local development processes (World Bank 2013).

The Philippine government has undertaken numerous poverty reduction efforts to address the problem of poverty and underdevelopment. Poverty reduction targets have been incorporated in the country development plan since the start of post-Marcos governments (1987-1992 Development Plan). All post-Martial Law presidents have made poverty reduction a priority in their program of government (Reyes et al. n.d.). Fidel Ramos (1992-98) had the Social Reform Program, Joseph Estrada (1998-01) had the *Lingap Para sa Mahirap* (Caring for the Poor), and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-10) had KALAHI, some components of which were continued by Benigno Aquino (2010-16) along with the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, locally known as the *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* (4Ps), and Bottom-up Budgeting (BuB).

Meanwhile, starting in the 1990s, anti-corruption and good governance have become buzzwords in international development. Numerous international organizations, including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), have taken up this agenda as an integral part of their development work. In the Philippines, the government adopted an anti-corruption program in 2000, which was mainstreamed in its development plan (Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 1998-2004) as a critical element of growth and development.

Since then, key government programs have adopted several anti-corruption/ good governance safeguards to prevent corruption and/or ensure efficient, effective, participatory, and transparent delivery of services and programs. Key features of this include an enhanced emphasis on citizen engagement and participation in the various aspects of development programs – from planning to monitoring. By enhancing the participation of citizens and civil society, it is expected that government programs become more efficient, effective and responsive to needs.

Citizen participation in programs, especially in monitoring, has also been viewed as useful in preventing corruption and political capture. This is particularly crucial given the culture of patronage politics, clientelism, bossism, and dynastic politics in the Philippines that make those in government, especially the highest officials, dictate the priorities of the government. This leaves citizens as mere spectators and recipients of whatever is given by the state. Despite decentralization, planning and budgeting in the Philippines have been overly centralized and top-down, with few inputs from ordinary citizens. As a result, budgets and plans have been unresponsive to the needs of citizens, especially the poor, and are prone to abuse and corruption, which hinders development and growth.

KALAHI started during a period in the Philippines when the clamor for political and economic reform was strong, right after another People Power uprising. With the ouster of former President Joseph Estrada due to corruption, the new administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed key reformists in her Cabinet. It formed part of the wave of reforms towards participatory governance to counteract control of the government by the few.

Key State Reform Actors

KALAHl (formally referred to as KALAHl-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services or KALAHl-CIDSS) officially started in 2003 under the leadership of former DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development) Secretary Corazon ‘Dinky’ Soliman. Prior to leading DSWD during the presidential terms of Arroyo and Aquino, Soliman was best known as a civil society leader. She was the Chairperson of the Caucus of Development NGOs Network (CODE-NGO) – the largest network of NGOs, people’s organizations (POs), and cooperatives in the Philippines. CODE-NGO is known as one of the key civil society actors in the Second People Power Revolution which resulted in the ouster of former President Estrada.

After the Second People Power movement in 2001, key figures from civil society were appointed to the Cabinet of the new administration of President Arroyo. Appointees from civil society, including Soliman, were part of the “reform wing” of Arroyo’s Cabinet (Aceron 2012). These reformists adhered to the democratic socialist strand of the reform movement. Democratic socialists recognize that reformers need to engage the traditional political and economic elite to gain entry into government and to push for reforms (Aceron 2012). Soliman served as the DSWD Secretary of former President Arroyo’s administration from 2001 to 2005. Soliman later resigned following Arroyo’s election scandal in 2005 where she allegedly rigged the results of the 2004 national elections in her favor.

Soliman had the support of former President Arroyo since KALAHl’s pilot test in 2002. Soliman developed the concept for KALAHl through a learning visit in Indonesia arranged by the World Bank. Soliman, at that time, was being “prepped” by a team of reformers who used to be part of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the administration of Fidel Ramos (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020). These reformers were also part of the civil society who took positions in the government and were responsible for significant progress in agrarian reform employing a strategy called *Bibingka Strategy*, a Philippine version of the sandwich strategy.¹

“When I heard of community organizing, community development, that made me interested because that’s my background in civil society,” says Soliman when retelling why she became interested in KALAHl. It also helped that there was already an existing program in DSWD with a community participation component called CIDDS (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020).

The Philippine government committed USD 82 million to KALAHl as counterpart funding to the USD 100 million loan of the World Bank. A paper attributes the interest of then-president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to woo the poor who were said to be strong supporters of her predecessor (Poncin 2017).

Even after Soliman’s resignation, KALAHl has continued as a national program to the present. It is expected to close this year if the government doesn’t seek additional support from the World Bank. The WB and ADB loans helped institutionalize KALAHl, and saved the program from closing abruptly because the new administration would need to renegotiate with the funders (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020).

At the beginning of KALAHl, because of the leadership of Dinky Soliman, the key civil society groups that engaged with the program were from the democratic left that helped in the ouster

of Estrada. The first batch of organizers mobilized for KALAHI were activists from the ranks of civil society. The initial plan was for NGOs to handle the organizing and citizen engagement of KALAHI, but NGOs turned it down for not wanting to receive funding from the government. Though NGOs have not been involved in the organizing on the ground, KALAHI's training was developed and carried out even up to today by non-government organizations (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020).

Soliman returned as DSWD Secretary from 2010 to 2016 under the administration of former President Aquino. During this period, KALAHI was considered as one of the key anti-poverty programs of the Aquino administration and had the support of the Human Development and Poverty Reduction Cluster (HDPRC) of the Cabinet.² KALAHI was scaled up into a national program called National Community Driven Development Program (NCDDP) in 2014. The HDPRC passed a resolution of support to this expansion which was signed by the leaders of the government agencies under the cluster. 165 mayors covered by KALAHI also signed a manifesto of support for the scaling up of CDD as a national poverty reduction strategy (DSWD 2018).

The World Bank has been the main international institutional ally of KALAHI since it officially began in 2003. It has committed more than USD 100 million in loans for KALAHI from 2003 to 2010 and an additional USD 59 million loan for its expansion until 2014. Currently, the World Bank has committed USD 479 million in loans – the largest so far – for KALAHI's expansion as a National Community Driven Development Program (NCDDP). Aside from providing direct financial support to KALAHI, the World Bank has also provided technical guidance in the implementation of the program as well as in acquiring grants from other international institutions.

Other key international allies of KALAHI are the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United States' Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). ADB is providing funding, policy and advisory technical assistance. It also supported the capacity-building component of the pilot test of the provincial Local Government Unit (LGU) engagement strategy. Additionally, MCC provided a grant worth USD 120 million for KALAHI's expansion from 2010 to 2016.

Other international actors supporting KALAHI provide assistance for particular aspects of the program. The Government of Australia – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (GoA-DFAT) focused on education through the construction and rehabilitation of schools and day care centers. The Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) of the Spanish Government focused on the capacity-building of LGUs in governance and development planning.

Table 1: Sources of KALAHl funding (in Php)

Project	Funding Source	Amount	Years Covered
Kalahi-CIDDS 1 (KC1) ³	World Bank ⁴ Loan	USD 100 M	2002 - 2009
	Gov't Fund ⁵	USD 82 M	
Kalahi-CIDDS Additional Funding (KC-AF) ⁶	World Bank ⁷ Loan	USD 59.12 M	2010 - 2014
	Gov't Fund ⁸	USD 45.70 M	
	Australia-WB PH Development Trust Fund ⁹ Grant	USD 10 M	
National Community-Driven Development Program (NCDDP)	World Bank ¹⁰ Loan	USD 479 M	2014 - 2023
	Gov't Fund ¹¹	USD 184.90 M	
	ADB ¹² Loan Gov't Fund / Counterpart ¹³	USD 372.10 M USD 291.56 M	2014 - 2019
World Bank Additional Funding for KC-NCDDP ¹⁴	World Bank Loan Gov't Fund	USD 300 M USD 230.47 M	2021 - 2023
Agencia Española de Cooperacion Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) ¹⁵	Grant	USD 10.96 (PhP 548 M)	2005 - 2014
ADB Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) ¹⁶	Grant	USD 12.86 (PhP 643 M)	2011 - 2014
ADB Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) ¹⁷	Grant	USD 2.44 (PhP 122 M)	2014 - 2016
ADB Additional Funding for Livelihood and Enterprise (L&E)	ADB Grant (Typhoon Yolanda Multi-Donor Trust Fund) ¹⁸	USD 5 M	2016 - 2018
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ¹⁹	Grant	USD 120 M	2011 - 2016
Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) ²⁰	Grant	PhP 842 M	2012 - 2016
Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) ²¹	Gov't Fund	PhP 1.9 B	2011 - 2016
Bottom-Up Budgeting (BUB) ²²	Gov't Fund	PhP 2.5 B	2013 - 2016
Construction of Schools for Lumads (CCL) ²³	Gov't Fund	PhP 547.5 M	2016 - 2018

Compiled by G-Watch from various sources

How Kalahi Enabled Citizen Engagement in Poor Municipalities

KALAHI was officially launched in 2003 as a national poverty reduction program of the Philippine government following a pilot test in 2002. The pilot test was conducted in six barangays²⁴ in the municipality of Dolores, Quezon with an allocation of PHP 1.8 million for community projects.

The first phase of KALAHI was implemented from 2003 to 2010. It covered two hundred of the poorest municipalities and included 5,645 subprojects. KALAHI was expanded from 2010 to 2014 to cover an additional 160 municipalities and 4,034 subprojects. Most of the projects funded by KALAHI involve access to basic social services and infrastructure (World Bank 2013). From 2014 to 2019, KALAHI has been scaled up as the National Community-Driven Development Program (NCDDP). As of December 2018, a total of eight hundred municipalities have participated in KALAHI with 27,055 funded subprojects (DSWD 2018).

The municipalities prioritized to receive KALAHI funds were those classified as poor. KALAHI contribution to municipalities was computed in consideration of their income class, population, poverty incidence, if affected by Typhoon Yolanda (2013), etc. As of September 2019, KALAHI had a total manpower of 2,539 officers and staff. Of these, 243 were area coordinators and 873 were community empowerment facilitators.

The National and Regional Program Management Teams from DSWD were responsible for the management and implementation of KALAHI. The National Program Management Office provides financial management services, and operations and technical support services. It was headed by a National Program Manager who is responsible for setting the strategies and directions for program implementation. The Regional Program Management Teams were responsible for the management and implementation of KALAHI at the regional level.


The Operations Department was composed of island cluster teams – Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Finally, the Technical Support Services Division is divided into five units – 1) Standards, 2) Capacity Development and Knowledge Management, 3) Safeguards and DRRM-CA, 4) Policy, and 5) Institutional Partnerships. At the municipal level, the Area Coordinating Teams was led by an Area Coordinator who managed the implementation of KALAHI in the municipality and barangays. Area Coordinating Teams built and strengthened the capabilities of the community and LGU stakeholders in the community subproject process.

The number of KALAHI project staff peaked in 2015 to 2016 reaching an average of 4,000 staff. This was due to the influx of international and national funding during this period which allowed the project to cover more municipalities and barangays. The DSWD normally assigned eight project coordinators for every twenty-five barangays.

KALAHI adopted a community-driven development (CDD) strategy that enables community participation in local development. It employed a method called Community Empowerment Activity Cycle (CEAC) that involved the community in all the phases of the project management cycle. CEAC has five stages:

- Social preparation stage. Communities identify local issues and propose solutions. The key activity during this stage is the participatory situation analysis (PSA) where volunteers assess the conditions identified by the community. The results of the PSA are validated by the community at a barangay (village) assembly or meeting;
- Subproject identification and development stage. Community members are trained to design and package subproject proposals that address their needs. A criteria-setting workshop is conducted where barangay representatives determine the criteria for ranking and selecting village proposals. The criteria developed by the barangay guides them in selecting and preparing project proposals;
- Subproject preparation, selection, and approval stage. Through the Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum, democratically elected barangay representatives select proposals to be funded by KALAHI following the criteria they have developed;
- Subproject implementation, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and operation and maintenance (O&M). Approved subproject proposals are implemented by the barangay. The barangay also engages local government officials for technical support and counterpart resources and learn procurement and financial management strategies (Asian Development Bank, 2012). O&M is also handled at this stage of the cycle;
- Transition stage. After the subprojects are completed, the community enters a transition stage before going into a new implementation of the CEAC. This involves a community-based evaluation where stakeholders such as the barangay, KALAHI staff, and local government officials and staff assess their performance and experience in delivering subprojects.

Figure 1. KALAHI-CIDSS Community Empowerment Activity Cycle (CEAC)



Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)

The program had a National Steering Committee co-chaired by the DSWD Secretary and the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) Lead Convenor, an inter-agency body composed of the Secretaries of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Finance (DOF), and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). Three civil society representatives nominated by government agencies, international funders, and the Leagues of Provinces, Municipalities, and Barangays were also included in the steering committee. The steering committee sets the policy direction and implementing guidelines, resolves issues, and imposes sanctions or grants incentives to barangay implementers.

The National and Regional Project Management Teams from DSWD served as the implementing arm. Aside from being Chairperson of the steering committee, the DSWD Secretary also served as the National Project Director of KALAH. The DSWD Regional Director or Assistant Director served as the Regional Project Manager of the program. The KALAH regional project management team coordinated with local government units, including barangays. DSWD assigned an area coordinator, a deputy area coordinator (an engineer), and a community facilitator for every five barangays in a municipality. They assisted in community mobilization and in the coordination between the barangay and LGUs and other institutions.

At the municipal level, an inter-barangay meeting / forum was initiated. It was attended by three representatives from each participating barangay including the Barangay Captain. Subprojects for KALAH funding were selected during the inter-barangay meeting/forum. Only the barangay representatives had voting rights.²⁵

Municipalities participating in KALAH received an annual grant from the national government worth PHP 300,000 (approximately USD 6,000) per barangay. This served as an incentive for local governments, including the barangays, to comply with and cooperate in KALAH participatory processes. The grant was allocated competitively between the barangays in the municipality, making it difficult to know beforehand which barangay would receive KALAH grants. This was meant to prevent local government politicians dictating which projects would receive funding or controlling the release of KALAH funding. Once a barangay was prioritized for a subproject, a community bank account was opened where the DSWD directly transferred the grant to the barangay.

Some of the key features of KALAH that are consistent with the practices of other CDD (community-driven development) programs include:

- Barangay volunteers are fully responsible for procurement and financial reporting.
- Municipal mayors have a limited role in approving subprojects due to them having no voting rights in the Municipal Inter-Barangay Forum.
- Communities are required to provide local counterpart contributions (either in cash or in-kind) from various sources helping them develop community capacity for resource mobilization (World Bank 2013).

(See Annex 2 for the list and description of existing accountability mechanisms in the KALAH program based on existing program documents.)

Following the national expansion of KALAH I, there have been efforts to transfer the facilitation role of DSWD to local governments to sustain and institutionalize CDD. DSWD has undertaken efforts to integrate CEAC in the local development planning processes. Meanwhile, at the national level, there are moves to pass a CDD Law that will institutionalize KALAH I as a regular program of DSWD. In the draft CDD bill,²⁶ DSWD remains as the central coordinator of KC-NCDDP in collaboration with the local governments. It's yet to be seen, hence, whether DSWD or the LGUs will be primarily responsible for the facilitation of KALAH I.

KALAHI Reform Dynamics and Gains

The interplay of actors and actions in KALAHI, particularly those employed by DSWD in enabling citizen engagement from the top resulted in three reform dynamics and gains:

- KALAHI generated increased citizen participation in governance at the community level, infusing new blood in existing mechanisms of representation and resulting in projects responsive to needs within the communities;
- KALAHI good governance features worked in ensuring effective and efficient program delivery;
- KALAHI included processes and standards aimed to avoid elite capture/ control and to shift power to the community;
- Despite these advances, the long-term sustainability of these bureaucratic improvements and power-shifts remain in doubt given that the program did not address national and local pre-existing power asymmetries.

More Participation, but Uncertain Quality

KALAHI-CIDSS was expanded into a national program called the KC-National Community-Driven Development Program (NCDDP). During its official rollout in 2014, the program was able to conduct preparatory activities in 659 municipalities, eighty percent of which were affected by Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as “Yolanda”). It was able to mobilize and train 60,418 community volunteers in project implementation (from preparation to maintenance).

According to the latest (2020) World Bank loan document on KALAHI, KC-NCDDP has covered a total of 18,781 barangays in 830 municipalities (ninety-eight percent of the target 847 poor municipalities), benefitting a total of 7.8 million households which is about forty-nine percent of the total households in the target areas. KC-NCDDP has financed a total of 28,421 community sub-projects (SPs), of which ninety-nine percent have already been completed, with an additional 1,035 sub-project expected to be funded and targeted for completion by the end of October 2020. (World Bank 2020).

Subprojects are mostly basic social services, environmental protection, and typhoon restoration infrastructure. The total number of community volunteers is now more than one million (DSWD 2019). The latest World Bank loan document (2020) specifies that the KALAHI sub-project implementation mobilized more than 600,000 community volunteers and provided temporary income of Php2.2 billion for 619,788 community laborers of which about thirty-nine percent were women.

Studies on KALAHI generally agree that the program has been effective in mobilizing communities to participate in local governance and development (Asian Development Bank 2012; Wong 2012; University Research Company 2016; White, Menon and Waddington 2018). The most common conclusion about participation in local governance is the increase in the participation in barangay assemblies and change in how the communities view the assemblies (Wong 2012; World Bank 2013). Prior to the implementation of KALAHI, communities viewed barangay assemblies as spaces in which the barangay officials would simply report their actions to the people. Now, barangay assemblies are viewed by the community as spaces for participation, transparency and accountability (Wong 2012; World Bank 2013). An ADB report on KC-NCDDP states that ninety-three percent of target municipalities have increased membership of people’s and civil society organizations in local development councils and special bodies. This is validated by the Open Government Partnership-Independent Reporting Mechanism (OGP-IRM) report that notes an increase in membership in POs and CSOs in local development councils and special bodies in 2015 and 2016 in KALAHI municipalities (Aceron 2017).

Community members have also become more aware of the income and expense details of their barangay (Wong 2012). People in local communities also highlight empowerment and greater community unity as a result of participating in KALAHI (University Research Company 2016). This is brought about by their experiences in participating in the planning, implementation, and maintenance of subprojects (University Research Company 2016). Sixty-five percent of the

households in targeted municipalities participated in the preparatory and planning phases of KALAH!; thirty-one percent participated in the implementation phase (World Bank 2013). KALAH! has also been noted to have increased civilian participation in local governance spaces and community organizations beyond the program. However, according to a study (Beatty, et.al. 2017, 60) the increased participation in community organizations has been “driven largely by cash and good contributions to civic and political groups, not the time people spent in these group meetings or the number of civic, political or volunteer groups in the barangay.” KALAH! also facilitated the creation of community-based organizations which eventually became members of Barangay Development Councils (World Bank, n.d.).

The evidence on the participation of the poor in KALAH! varies. According to ADB (2012), the poorest members of the barangay are usually the most involved in the selection and implementation of subprojects. In specific areas, “the poorest have been the most articulate” in expressing their concerns at village assemblies and in advocating for certain subprojects. However, there are studies that show there has been a decline in the participation of the poor over time (Saguin 2017).

In terms of women’s participation in KALAH!, the program has gender inclusion measures. The KALAH! Project Administration Manual states that participation of women in meetings should be at least fifty percent. Also, at least five out of ten signatories of subproject proposal documents and at least two out of five volunteers in the Barangay Sub Project Management Team (BSPMT) should be women.

Furthermore, KALAH! offered training for women to participate in public decision-making and to equip them for paid KALAH! construction work opportunities (White, Menon and Waddington 2018). Assessments of the program show that women are actively involved in the implementation of KALAH! (Asian Development Bank 2012). By the end of the first expansion of KALAH! in 2014, fifty-three percent of community facilitators, fifty-five percent of barangay assembly participants, and fifty-eight percent of committee members were women (World Bank 2014). Out of the fifty-eight percent women committee members, half of them are in leadership roles (World Bank 2014). However, the participation of men and women is still gendered; whereas women are more likely to participate in proposal selection and preparation, men participate more in the project implementation (World Bank 2014).

G-Watch leaders and partners in San Miguel, Bohol and Sibagat, Agusan del Sur attest to how KALAH! provided “complete participation,” referring to the participation of citizens from planning to monitoring. “Totoong community-driven ang KALAH!” [KALAH! is truly community-driven], says one of the participants in a G-Watch roundtable discussion (Roundtable discussion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, September 3, 2019). Analyn Lumactod, G-Watch local coordinator for Bohol and former KALAH! LGU point person also attests to how KALAH! ensured the barangays determine the projects and not the mayor. “Sa mentality ni Mayor Bonior, kung sino ang may right na mag-implement, hindi sya mag-intervene. Sa KALAH!, sa LGU counterpart, local finance ang nag-set, kung funds ng barangay, barangay mag-set.” [Mayor Bonior’s principle was whoever was mandated to implement, he would let them be and not intervene. In KALAH!, for the local counterpart, local finance set it. The funds for barangays were set by the Barangays.] (A. Lumactod, interview, March 12, 2020)

There is also evidence of procedural spill-overs benefiting the quality of local governance: barangay assembly being operational, volunteers becoming officials of the barangay, new peoples’ organizations being formed and volunteers becoming representatives of civil society in local government.

According to DSWD, more than one million community volunteers have been mobilized by KALAH I since 2014 (World Bank 2020 report pegs it at 40,000 ‘core groups’ of community volunteers). This is the result of CDD trainings where an average of 32 community volunteers per barangay had been trained. KALAH I resulted in the increase in membership in people’s organizations and civil society organizations in the community.

KALAH I has brought about a new breed of barangay leaders who are empowered and can effectively engage elected barangay officials (World Bank 2013; Beatty et al. 2017). These leaders are considered as more committed and service-oriented. In some instances, they have been elected as barangay officials themselves (World Bank 2013). There is no evidence, however, how exactly these new barangay leaders enabled by KALAH I performed and whether this gain has been widespread. Furthermore, there is also the question of what kind of community volunteers have been mobilized and enabled – have they developed autonomy beyond KALAH I?

There is also a shift in what people look for in their barangay officials as a World Bank (2013) report on KALAH I shows: “Traditionally, leaders are rated highly if they are available, understanding and able, within limits, to bring resources to the community. Households in treatment barangays in Agusan del Sur now also care about whether leaders are consultative, transparent and able to plan for the future.”

However, despite some indications of spillover effects, there is still no evidence how many of the localities have improved the quality of participation and representation of citizens, in general, due to KALAH I. Furthermore, although the program has been successful in empowering barangay volunteers, its effect on the wider barangay citizenry remains to be seen (World Bank 2013; Beatty et al. 2017).

This tilting of the balance of power to the citizens has allowed projects to be more responsive to the needs of the community. Studies on the impact of KALAH I conclude that the projects selected by the program have been responsive to the needs of the community (Asian Development Bank 2012; Wong 2012). Community members find the projects to be useful, especially in terms of transportation and access to goods and services (Asian Development Bank 2012; Wong 2012; University Research Company 2016; Beatty et al. 2017). The positive impact on accessibility is due to the investments in small infrastructure, especially roads. In terms of health, the number of community members visiting a health facility has increased (Wong 2012). This is driven by the increase in the use of public health stations which can be attributed to the program (Wong 2012).

Enabling Powershifts: Mixed Successes

KALAHI mechanisms minimized elite capture at the local level by limiting the role of provincial and municipal LGUs in the selection of projects and the release of KALAHI funds. In the Philippines, where patronage politics and clientelism are prevalent, reforms that empower the community need to proactively shift the balance of power in favor of communities and citizens. Often, barangay and local government officials dictate the priorities of the communities without participation of the people. KALAHI provided spaces for communities to meet, identify, prioritize, implement, and monitor projects they deemed important in their community.

‘Communities’ for the KALAHI program refers to geographic areas: barangays and sub-barangays called ‘purok’. By ‘community-driven,’ the program refers to how these geographical communities organize and decide on which developmental projects to prioritize. While KALAHI undertook efforts to ensure participation of more vulnerable sectors like women, indigenous peoples, etc., the targets of mobilization and capacity-building were general, i.e., all the members of the community.

In KALAHI, the communities organized their own governing bodies who then would lead in project development, implementation, and monitoring. Although Inter-Barangay Forums were done at the municipal level, the municipal LGU had no voting rights in the selection of projects to be funded by KALAHI. Only barangay representatives vote on which project proposal would receive KALAHI funding. The Barangay Assembly was also the final decision maker in the implementation of projects. The Barangay Development Council – which is under the Barangay Assembly – was tasked to oversee the work of the committees involved in KALAHI. The barangay committees included a bids and awards committee and an audit and inventory committee. The KALAHI mechanism for fund release also ensured that elite capture was minimized and that resources went to the priorities identified by the community. This was done through the direct transfer of KALAHI funds from DSWD to the community bank account. Any non-compliance to standards by local government officials could be reported using the grievance redress system linked to national-level officials.

The role of the DSWD national and regional project management teams in minimizing elite capture and improving local governance is nonetheless consequential. Their oversight and monitoring function from the national to the local level has been effective in minimizing governance concerns in KALAHI (World Bank 2014). Most notable was the role of DSWD-assigned community facilitators who “mobilize their assigned communities, build capacity for collective action, ensure adequate representation and participation and, where necessary, mitigate elite domination” (Asian Development Bank 2012). In other words, the DSWD, mainly through its community facilitators, made sure made sure that the process of enabling the community to decide, implement and monitor projects was followed.

The community facilitators were trained to navigate political realities on the ground through capacity-building provided by partner NGOs of DSWD (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020). DSWD tapped activist community organizers at the early stage of KALAHI to serve as community facilitators, a role they continue to perform. Community facilitators were trained to deal with local chief executives, some of whom resisted KALAHI since it took away the decision-making from them (D. Soliman, interview, February 20, 2020). Facilitators dialogued with local politicians, and

could incentivize cooperation by offering recognition for good governance champions through the Gawad sa Paglilingkod sa Sambayanan (GAPAS, KALAHI's award to good-performing LGUs). As a result, many local chief executives eventually supported KALAHI.

Such ways of managing local chief executives led some to accuse KALAHI of perpetuating 'performative good governance,' i.e., local government officials who "style themselves as reformist leaders, discursively and through a set of performances, regardless of the actual disregard for good governance principles in evidence in some of their practices" (Poncin 2017). The other criticism is how constructive engagement with local government officials in KALAHI led to 'elite control' in some localities, i.e., "elite domination of the participatory process but benefits still accrue to the poor" (Saguin 2018).

The selection of subprojects for KALAHI funding is an inherently political process. Assessments of the program have concluded that the competition for KALAHI funding at the Inter-Barangay Forum is a double-edged sword. In KALAHI, barangays propose projects, but funding is determined through a vote among the barangays.²⁷ While the competition element of project selection encouraged participation, it also stirred politicking and collusion between barangays (Labonne and Chase 2009; Asian Development Bank 2012). There were cases where barangays that did not receive any funding raised accusations of conspiracy among other barangays and ended up being discouraged from participating in KALAHI (Asian Development Bank 2012; World Bank 2013).

Though not without complications, the Inter-Barangay Forum has become a venue for the different barangays to come together and collectively agree on allocation of resources. The inter-barangay mechanism that existed prior to KALAHI, the Liga ng mga Barangay,²⁸ is not known for being able to collectively allocate resources because municipal funds are allocated mainly by the local chief executive subject to the approval and adoption of the municipal council. In other words, through KALAHI, the power to allocate resources shifted to barangays from municipalities, albeit limited to the KALAHI funds. The local chief executives who used to have almost-total control over resources coming into his/ her municipality have had to abide by the participatory processes of KALAHI. While the local chief executive could still find a way to influence the process, such was not considered normal or acceptable that could be reported to DSWD through mechanisms such as the grievance redress. However, there is no evidence to prove that the inter-barangay forums continue to function as checks to the mayor's control over local development projects as the program has started shifting the facilitation role to the local governments.

At the level of the barangay, despite efforts to protect the spaces from elite capture, there is still anecdotal evidence of efforts of barangay officials to co-opt the process. Labonne and Chase (2009) document elected village leaders overriding community preferences in more unequal villages. They explain that the reliance on the barangay captain in unequal villages could be due to the need for leadership who would reconcile competing and varied interests. In the case of San Miguel, Bohol, a local site of Government Watch (G-Watch),²⁹ the mayor from 2007-2016, who won a KALAHI award, Mayor Claudio Bonior, supported KALAHI but knew the limits of his powers in KALAHI that he never intervened in the process (Focus group discussion with KALAHI staff of San Miguel, Bohol, March 21, 2018; A. Lumactod, interview, March 12, 2020).

The five most influential people in the selection of subprojects were ranked in an assessment of KALAHI by the Asian Development Bank (2012). In descending order, the most influential people are the village captains, other village officials, community residents, community volunteers, and the mayor. According to the assessment, this should not be seen as an indicator of elite capture given the widespread satisfaction of the community with the projects and services delivered to

them. The assessment states that, “Communities believe that the decisions of their village officials reflect community priorities. Given the above, it is more likely that village officials are credible to residents and that these officials and residents often have a confluence of views on community priorities” (Asian Development Bank 2012). In other words, despite reported attempts of local government officials to co-opt the KALAH I process, there are indications that the 22,119 approved subprojects amounting to PHP 27.7 billion from 2014-2019 have had robust citizen participation, with communities themselves implementing and managing the projects. Since KALAH I targeted poor municipalities and the funds were directly transferred to community accounts for projects implemented by the communities themselves, it is clear that the program was able to direct the flow of additional resources to the poorest communities. As earlier noted, KC-NCDDP has already financed a total of 28,421 community sub-projects.

Despite the participatory and accountable processes followed in KALAH I that aimed to shift the power to the community and avoid elite capture, KALAH I did not change existing inequalities in the communities.

The latest data from World Bank (2020) shows that sixty-seven percent of the participation in KALAH I was from marginalized groups, such as indigenous peoples, women and grantees of the conditional cash transfer program (i.e., *Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program* or 4Ps), representing the poorest in the village. However, there have been empirical studies showing that the participation of the poorest members of the community dwindled over time (Saguin 2018) and that in some instances the agendas that were advanced and funded were those advocated by people who already had a good status economically and socially in the community.

KALAH I introduced proactive measures to involve women, indigenous people and the poorest members of the community. Community organizers of KALAH I ensured that these under-represented sectors were involved in community processes. This may still have not addressed deep-seated existing power asymmetries within, though. Because the KALAH I project sought the participation of the entire community, existing inequalities affect the quality of participation even with proactive measures. Gender roles, educational background, prior standing in the community and existing social capital may formally and informally dictate whose voices are heard in deciding community priorities. There is evidence showing that issues that were critical but not popular, such as violence against women, were not considered (World Bank 2015). More unequal villages were also potentially more likely to receive projects because either they rely on power brokers or village heads (Lebonne 2009). This part about KALAH I’s possible unintended consequences would benefit from further empirical investigation.

Another explanation for the persisting asymmetry of power in communities despite KALAH I is the short duration of the KALAH I project. This makes any sustainable transformative power shifts almost impossible. While there were municipalities that had KALAH I since 2003, like San Miguel, Bohol, there are barangays where KALAH I was a one-off. Furthermore, with DSWD starting to transfer its role as central facilitator to the local governments, the proactive efforts to address asymmetry of power and address inequality may not be carried out uniformly.

Effective Program Delivery, Uncertain Sustainability

Good governance is a core consideration in the design of KALAHI. KALAHI utilizes a participatory process that involves competition among the villages, which removes the discretionary power of bureaucrats and political leaders by allowing the barangays themselves to pick which projects advance. The increased participation of citizens is also accompanied by barangay poverty reduction plans in KALAHI target barangays (Aceron 2017).

had KALAHI proactive disclosure, monitoring, and grievance redress features. Community monitoring began at the Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA) or the first barangay assembly. Volunteer community monitors prepared their own monitoring and work plan following the barangay action plan (BAP) and expected outputs by the end of CEAC. They also monitored the implementation of KALAHI and the delivery of commitments at the community and municipal levels. Initial findings were presented at the Barangay Activity Reporting where the community discussed lessons and issues. These were then consolidated and presented at the Municipal Accountability Reporting. Aside from contributing to the improvement of projects and services in the community, results of the community monitoring were also included in DSWD's database system to monitor key performance indicators and for improving KALAHI's design and implementation.

The structure of KALAHI at the level of the barangay also had monitoring mechanisms at every stage of the project. Barangay-level committees were formed to oversee procurement, auditing, and implementation of projects. They were required to report on the financial status and physical progress of projects (World Bank 2005; FGD with KALAHI staff, San Miguel Bohol, March 21, 2018).

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was also conducted by DSWD, funding agencies, and third-parties (academic institutions and civil society). M&E conducted internally by DSWD focused on program performance based on key performance indicators in the KALAHI results framework. External evaluations conducted by funding agencies and third-party mostly focused on KALAHI's process, outcome, and impact. Reports on the results of the evaluations were made available online through KALAHI's website (Kalahi-CIDSS, n.d.).

The government monitoring system of KALAHI was multi-level, stretching from the national to the barangay level in order to provide effective controls (World Bank 2014; ADB 2016). Barangay-level monitoring informed the data on project completion. It is, however, unclear whether there was a working independent/ third-party monitoring of KALAHI. While some reports say that local journalists and community-based organizations were invited to act as watchdogs (World Bank 2005), there is no evidence to show independent monitoring was widely happening. This is crucial because of concerns of bias in the community monitoring of KALAHI, such as when the "monitoring officer was biased because he/she undertook monitoring and evaluation depending on his/her interest or preferences" (Delfin 2017).

G-Watch, in a forum-workshop on 'accountability of poverty reduction programs' concludes that "there is a need to check government claims and data, but civil society only has anecdotal evidence from localized & scattered engagement, no vertically-integrated civil society monitoring yet." (G-Watch forum-workshop, May 24, 2018). There is anecdotal evidence (Poncin 2017, ADB 2012)

of how local governments manipulate or “sanitize” monitoring results to ensure fund releases. Performance-based release of funds and the volatility and instability of development funding discouraged independent monitoring as this could negatively affect future access of funds (Poncin 2017; ADB 2012). Monitoring also tended to focus on efficiency and effectiveness indicators, but are constrained in looking at the quality and impact of participation. (See Annex 3 for KALAH I Performance Indicators)

The same study (Poncin 2017) that specifically looked into Bohol at an early period of the program further pointed out how the municipal governments did not have the capacity to supervise KALAH I projects and how the monitoring of development partners could even condone old traditional ways of mayor-controlled processes that is anathema to what KALAH I was for. The low capacity of municipal governments in M&E even at the latter part of the KALAH I has been pointed out in assessments (URC 2016). In San Miguel, Bohol, monitoring continues to this day using the Sustainability Evaluation Tool (SET) that DSWD oversees. San Miguel, Bohol is also currently supporting the transitioning of KALAH I monitors to barangay-based monitoring teams that will cover all critical local projects in San Miguel, Bohol with the help of G-Watch-San Miguel, Bohol (Analyn Lumactod, G-Watch local coordinator/ former KALAH I coordinator for San Miguel, Bohol, interview, March 26, 2019, March 12, 2020).

Meanwhile, while monitoring and evaluation reports were made available online, the timeliness of these reports were unclear and there was hardly any effort to disseminate it proactively to the public to encourage accountability (G-Watch forum-workshop, May 24, 2018). This is the same for access to information in KALAH I, in general. Access to information is formally stated as a right and feature of KALAH I and information is being made accessible online. This is done through the KALAH I and DSWD websites. Status of the projects is also made online through KALAH I’s geotagging website (“KALAH I CIDSS-NCDDP | Geotagging” n.d.). It is uncertain, however, if barangays also make information available using traditional means (e.g., bulletin board posts) which may be more accessible to community members with no access to the internet.

According to KALAH I documents, KALAH I’s grievance redress system (GRS) serves as both an avenue where people can air their grievances and complaints related to the program, and as a feedback mechanism. Some DSWD officials view this as a mechanism to prevent elite capture.

However, a formal mechanism solely for feedback was not available. Program feedback is usually gathered through the GRS or the barangay assemblies (World Bank). A formal grievance redress mechanism was institutionalized in most KALAH I areas. Citizens could file a written (e.g., letter, email, text message) or verbal (e.g., phone call, walk-in) complaint/feedback. Grievances could be filed anonymously and should be processed in five to sixty days depending on the type of grievance.

Although formal mechanisms for complaints were available, many community members preferred to resolve complaints and receive feedback informally (ADB 2012). In the 4th quarter of 2018, around forty-eight percent of complaints were filed verbally and thirty-eight percent through barangay assemblies (DSWD 2018). Community awareness and appreciation of the formal complaint mechanisms varied, with some communities having no knowledge of it (ADB 2012). Efforts were made to address this and the number of complaints filed in the GRS became part of the performance measures of KALAH I. A KALAH I official who opted to remain anonymous said this could have resulted in manufactured or forced complaints.

The latest World Bank report on KALAHI reported that 107,596 complaints have been filed through KALAHI GRS, ninety-six percent of which are requests for additional information or non-contentious suggestions/comments while four percent are complaints about the Project rules/procedures and 0.6 percent are issues raised about financial management. The resolution rate of grievances is at ninety-nine percent, as per World Bank (2020). However, both the nature of the complaints (whether these were cases of corruption or elite control, for instance, or simple feedback) and the definition for 'resolved' are unclear.

In sum, the evidence on elite capture and whether there was an effective sustainable powershift seem mixed. It remains an empirical gap how many of KALAHI localities experienced elite capture/control and performative good governance and how many genuinely experienced transformation or powershifts.

Challenges and Sustainability

Delays in KALAHI projects have been a perennial issue. Findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) reports on DSWD have consistently drawn attention to the delays in the implementation of KALAHI projects which have resulted in unutilized funds and failures to address community needs on time. The usual reasons for project delays include delay in the transferring of KALAHI grants from the national government to the community level, inadequate assistance and monitoring by regional DSWD personnel, and failure of the LGU to provide its counterpart resources (Commission on Audit 2012-2015). For example, COA reported that only forty-seven percent of KALAHI projects worth PHP 329 million were completed in 2015. This falls short of the seventy percent KALAHI intermediate outcome indicator for the year and also did not maximize the allotted budget worth PHP 697 million.

There are also limits to the accountability and citizen engagement features of KALAHI. The most cited limitation is the operations and maintenance (O&M) of KALAHI projects (University Research Company 2016; Commission on Audit 2016 & 2017). The lack of capacity building efforts for O&M diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of project monitoring and sustainability of completed KALAHI projects (Commission on Audit 2016). Community participation in KALAHI also decreases after project completion and during the O&M phase of the project cycle. A study by the University Research Company (2016) cites the following limitations in the O&M phase: poor transfer of responsibilities from the Barangay Sub-Project Management Committee (BSPMC) to the O&M committee after project completion; limited financial management capacity, especially among BAWASAs; and unclear roles and responsibilities of the O&M committee in all phases of the project.

There is also room for improvements in KALAHI's transparency. Currently, emphasis is given on making information about KALAHI and its subprojects available online. However, there is a question of how extensive is the dissemination and how useful are the information made available. Also, information made accessible online can be unorganized, difficult to search, and is not user-friendly. Details of KALAHI subprojects are usually uploaded in PDF format, making it difficult for users to sort and aggregate information. The most user-friendly of the online platforms is the KALAHI geotagging website, which is not easily searchable when one makes a Google search for "KALAHI-CIDSS".

The GRS/ feedbacking is being used but constrained to the operations/ workings of the program (Focus group discussion, San Miguel, Bohol, 19 March 19, 2018). While KALAHI has a working GRM that says 99.98% of grievances are "satisfactorily resolved" as of 2018 (DSWD Freedom of Information Portal), the definition of resolution is quite fuzzy and tentative: "referral of the complaint to the appropriate decision-making bodies." Also, the GRM manual did not specifically state an acknowledgment mechanism or the details of the appeal process. The most recent report that is readily accessible is dated and does not provide the actual number of grievances, which points to a problem of proactive disclosure in KALAHI GRS.

KALAHI's citizen engagement and accountability mechanisms such as community monitoring and GRM seem generally operational and compliant to standards. However, there is a need to take a closer look at capacity-building. Current capacity-building initiatives focus on how community members should go through the process of participation rather than delving into the broader concept of citizenship. A sense of ownership is not cultivated by current capacity-building initiatives. While volunteer-leaders say they are empowered to speak up thanks to KALAHI trainings, this

is under the notion that the program will continue for a longer period of time. When asked what community members will do if the program is discontinued or whether they would demand the same participatory processes in other programs, they resort to “hoping” that the government will continue the program and give them more funds (Focus group discussion, San Miguel, Bohol, 19 March 19, 2018; G-Watch roundtable discussion on state of accountability in poverty reduction programs Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, May 2017 and September 3, 2019).

Assessments of KALAH! generally focus on its desired outcomes – community empowerment, improved access to basic services, and improved local governance. Assessments on the impact of the program on access to basic services is robust, with most of the published studies and reports extensively analyzing the types of projects KALAH! funded and its impact on income, consumption, health, and education (*See Annex 3 for an Inventory of Assessment Studies and the Methodology and Indicators Used*).

However, assessments on how the projects are sustained and maintained are lacking. For instance, assessments clearly show that KALAH! enabled collective action, but whether this ‘change’ only took place while the program was implemented remains a question. Operations and maintenance is one of the major challenges that Annual Commission on Audit reports and a study by the University Research Company (2016) cites. How KALAH! empowers communities usually focus on quantity – such as the rate of participation in community assemblies, number of community volunteers trained, etc. – and less on the quality of the participation (e.g., sense of ownership, deeper understanding of governance, etc.). Finally, how the program improves local governance is the least explored in assessments. How the program impacts municipal-level governance and supports the achievement of the goals and aspirations of the Local Government Code and overall local development plans are key gaps in the assessments of KALAH!.

The weaknesses in the assessment studies can be attributed to the limitations on what data the KALAH! monitoring system gathers. KALAH!’s current monitoring system is not designed to gather data useful for measuring achievement of transformative goals. For instance, KALAH! monitoring system gathers data on how many KALAH! leaders became members of local special bodies, but what happened to these leaders next, whether they become leaders who advance reforms in the community or whether they were assimilated or got recruited into traditional political machines is not being monitored.

The monitoring system is not linked to the broader analytical questions that inform strategies and look into the program’s transformational goals. While the KALAH! monitoring system is perhaps the strongest among government programs in the country, it remains technocratic, i.e., focusing only on the efficiency and immediate effectiveness of the program.

While KALAH! has generated improvement in the responsiveness of government projects (including how the mechanisms for citizen engagement and accountability operate), it remains top-down and supply-driven with no clear plan to enable demand, voice and strategic claim-making (i.e. covering processes and programs in government that will make a bigger difference). The danger of such is that there is empowerment only as long as the program is there, but it is unable to propel transformation and poses a sustainability problem. The process continues in some localities with the commitment of barangay and local government officials but funding is a perpetual question.

It is a question whether societal transformation is an aim of KALAH!. The unintended consequence could be control and framing of citizen action, especially if proven that no autonomous mass action happened during and after the program outside of the facilitated processes of DSWD.

Analysis and Key Lessons from KALAH I as a Sandwich Strategy Case

KALAH I is a program by the Department of Social Welfare and Development that aims to strengthen community participatory processes in local development planning. Adopting the community-driven development strategy in 2014, KALAH I-CIDDS has been enhanced into the KC-National Community-Driven Development Program that aims to capacitate communities to be active partners in local development and to support improvement in local governance. Community capacity building in KC-NCDDP is done through a method called Community Empowerment Activity Cycle (CEAC) that involves the community in all the phases of project management.

Investigating KALAH I as a sandwich strategy case brings to the fore the experience of an initiative where the government, through an agency – in this case, the DSWD, took the lead in enabling citizen participation in local governance, particularly in budgeting for community development.

The Philippine Government has substantially invested in KALAH I, with an elaborate management structure and thick human resources from national to the community level. With its total manpower of 2,539 officers and staff (which at one point peaked at 4,000), of which 243 are area coordinators and 873 are community empowerment facilitators, the program was able to facilitate community and citizen engagement nationwide.

The following are the features of KALAH I that enabled and supported collective action:

- Funds directly transferred to the communities, which removed the control of LGUs over resources and gave it to the people, something very different from prior governance practices, especially in early 2000 when KALAH I was first introduced. This was made possible by loans from the World Bank and a secretary who championed the people/ community.
- Open, inclusive, participatory processes, supported and facilitated by community empowerment facilitators of the national government who were trained to navigate political dynamics, successfully checked efforts of political players (such as the barangay captains) to co-opt or undermine the process and limited corruption or abuse;
- In cases where the above check did not work, there was a grievance redress system (GRS) for complaints against barangay or LGU officials, with the top management ensuring complaints filed via GRS are responded to quickly and appropriately, especially when it involved political interference. The system is meant to ensure that people did not worry about reprisal since they got the backing of the program. In other words, GRS was designed to prevent elite capture. There is, however, no solid evidence to back that the GRS has been used for this purpose.
- DSWD officials handled relationships with the political elites (the mayors, the congresspersons, etc.) through dialogues and by allowing them to take the credit for the program. This meant that DSWD was also handling the politics of neutralizing the political elites to ensure they did not hinder the program. However, there is evidence that such management of the local political

elites has jeopardized the independence of people's voice, potentially facilitating elite capture or control.

Overall, these features of the KALAH I system supported collective action. To some extent, these measures lowered the risk for collective action and the threat of reprisal.

However, the intervention to enable powershift was not enough, which could explain why the results are mixed across localities and the sustainability of the gains remains a question. Three limitations: (1) Empowerment in KALAH I, was in general terms, i.e., community as a whole. And though KALAH I took proactive measures to empower the more vulnerable and marginalized sectors (women, indigenous peoples and the poorest), the effort may not be sufficient to address the deep-seated asymmetries of power . (2) Measures to stop or avoid elite capture and control could have been undermined by efforts to woo support and/or accommodate local governments. The ability of the local governments to adapt and accommodate KALAH I could be construed as a case of elite control perpetuating patronage politics, where the municipal government, particularly the local chief executive, allowed the process to happen to get the credit (pretending to be a champion of good governance) or to somehow influence the outcome. (3) There is no evidence that the GRS was used for the purpose of preventing elite control/ capture. The decision of NGOs not to handle the organizing in KALAH I was also a pivotal moment as this could have resulted in an independent civil society organizing from national to communities that could have sustained and expanded the participatory and empowerment processes in KALAH I.

KALAH I has resulted in projects responsive to community needs and infused dynamism in barangay governance, tilting the balance of power more to the citizens and communities. As a result of CDD trainings where an average of thirty-two community volunteers per barangay have been trained, more than one million community volunteers have been mobilized by KALAH I since 2014. A new breed of barangay leaders were empowered to effectively engage elected community and local officials. Some even won public office, which could potentially pave the way for a new kind of leadership in community-level governance. KALAH I also resulted in the increase in membership in POs and CSOs in the community, thereby contributing to the thickening of civil society, though without assurance that civil society became more able to claim the space that KALAH I provided on their own and sustainably.

This tilting of the balance of power to the citizens allowed projects to be more responsive to the needs of the community. However, there is a gap in evidence on what have been the gains and outcomes out of the million community volunteers mobilized and capacitated, the new leaders from KALAH I infused in local governance, the increase in membership in POs and CSOs in the community. Have these contributed to improving the politics and governance at the local level towards gains that benefit the people and the community in the long run? Or, have these led to worsening of patronage and political capture (as in case when politicians recruit new leaders to become their operators and organizers)?

In conclusion, KALAH I clearly enabled powershifts at the local level, leading to considerable outcomes and gains. However, the shift of power to citizens and communities cannot be considered enduring as it remains dependent on the continuation of the KALAH I program (as coordinated centrally by DSWD) and on the local political context.

The powershifts in KALAH I cannot be considered enduring, arguably because the transformative potential of its reform strategy has not been tapped. At the very least, there is no evidence yet for spillovers that would have made KALAH I transformative. The program was an initiative of

reformers in government who were part of civil society with a broader transformative agenda in politics and governance. However, the degree to which KALAHI further contributes to the broader transformative agenda in politics and governance of societal forces outside of the state is a question.

Most of the positive features of KALAHI were due to government-initiated mechanisms, with no evidence proving that there has been significant or widespread spill-over to independent and autonomous multi-level organizing in civil society and social movement. Citizen participation was strongest at the community level, but the participation was framed, structured, and designed from the top, by the national government. Some of the volunteers trained ended up becoming active leaders in the barangay, even being elected in office and serving as representative in mandated local participatory bodies. However, there is no empirical evidence to show that such exposure to a new kind of governance and the entry of new blood in local government through KALAHI-infused dynamism led to a new way of governing local governments over time. The lack of link of these KALAHI leaders to an independent civil society organization or social movement make them vulnerable to being “eaten up by the system.”

If citizen participation enabled by KALAHI is not sustained and broadened, the sandwich strategy in KALAHI could result in a project operating towards a strategic agenda of citizen control and legitimization of the state. The powershift gains could be momentary, subject to who holds power in government and what programs the national government decided to implement, with no “fire from below” that pushes and pressures the “fire from above”. If so, this is a big point of departure from the original use of the sandwich strategy that empowers and enables a transformative agenda of movements, communities, and citizens. While there might have been that intent at the beginning, the limited enabling of autonomous multi-level civil society organizing and engagement in KALAHI could explain why despite delivering powershift gains at a given time, a supposed transformative citizen empowerment and governance reform strategy remains short in guaranteeing a sustainable transformation of politics and governance at the local level.

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Interviews and discussions:

Dinky Soliman, former DSWD secretary, interview, February 20, 2020, Quezon City

Analyn Lumactod, G-Watch local coordinator/ former KALAHl coordinator for San Miguel, Bohol, interview, 21 March 2018, 26 March 2019, 12 March 2020

Alt Suello, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-Bohol Regional Office, March 16, 2018, Tagbilaran, Bohol

Focus ground discussion with DSWD Central Office – KALAHl staff, 24 April 2018, San Miguel, Bohol

Focus group discussion with local KALAHl staff San Miguel and G-Watch, Bohol, 21 March 2018

Focus group discussion with barangay KALAHl officials, San Vicente, San Miguel, Bohol, 20 March 2018

G-Watch roundtable discussion on state of accountability in poverty reduction programs. Sibagat, Agusan del Sur. May 2017, 3 September 2019

G-Watch forum-workshop assessing the accountability system of poverty reduction programs, May 24, 2018

Annexes

Annex 1: List and description of existing accountability mechanisms in the KALAHI program

Program Monitoring: Results Monitoring	<p>Results monitoring is designed to address the “so what” question by measuring and reporting if program implementation is progressing in the right pace and direction toward achieving the PDO. It is a continuous process of collecting and analyzing information to compare how well a project,</p> <p>program or policy is being implemented against expected results.</p> <p>As it entails a program-wide perspective, analysis is done primarily in the national level or by Program Managers, supported by reports from the RPMOs. Using the TOC and Results Framework, KC-NCDDP M&E Officers periodically look into outcome-level KPIs and determine if these are being met. In conducting results monitoring, means of verification (MOVs), which are identified in the next parts, are processed using the database system to automatically generate data on the KPIs. Data gathered are usually compared against barangay and municipal baseline information and complemented by special studies, as further discussed in the Evaluation section.</p>
Program Monitoring: Operations Monitoring	<p>Operations or implementation monitoring is designed to address compliance, answering the “did they do it” question. The implementation approach focuses on monitoring and assessing if a project, program or policy is being executed, and it often links the implementation to a particular unit of responsibility. However, it does not provide policymakers, managers, and stakeholders with an understanding of the success or failure of that project, program, or policy.</p> <p>In the case of the Program, operations monitoring holds its relevance in helping ensure the timeliness of implementation, especially given the urgency of rehabilitation activities. In addition, it determines if Program standards are being met at every stage of the CEAC. Specifically, this focuses on tracking and technical-level management of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Various community processes;- Physical and financial management activities within the CEAC, based on time, quality and cost standards in the activity work plans of KC-NCDDP facilitators and beneficiary communities; and- Standards in the different KC-NCDDP technical sub-manuals. <p>Most of the M&E tools are geared toward operations monitoring and are used not only by M&E Officers but also by other program staff at different levels. In the conduct of operations monitoring, it is thus important that all implementers are familiar with their roles in data gathering, quality assessment, and analysis, as shall be discussed in the succeeding sections. It is also highly suggested that information sharing and regular meetings are held to ensure timely technical assistance so as to immediately address red flags and other findings that may have bearing in the conduct of CEAC activities.</p>

Program Monitoring:

Community Monitoring

Community Monitoring (CM) is composed of several activities starting from the Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA) for CEAC and First Barangay Assembly for the Accelerated CEAC. Every sitio/purok is to have one volunteer Community Monitor. For areas implementing the standard CEAC, PSA volunteers become Community Monitors and are guided to do operations monitoring based on their Barangay Action Plan (BAP). They prepare their own Monitoring Plan and Workplan, taking in consideration the major BAP activities, preparatory activities and expected outputs by the end of the cycle. Community Monitors also look into the KC-NCDDP implementation and the delivery of community and municipal commitments under the Program. These are presented during the Barangay Activity Reporting and are discussed by the rest of the community members to identify lessons and issues that affect their development. Findings are then consolidated and presented by the Barangay Representation Teams at the Municipal Accountability Reporting. In all these, ACTs and SRPMO/RPMO staff provide guidance and technical support, while LGU and MCT staff likewise provide necessary data and technical assistance.

The findings from CM are expected to contribute in designing local activities to promote community development. However, it should be noted that this information is also valuable to the Program itself and is included in the database system as reference information to monitor KPIs and for future enhancements in Program design and implementation. Given this, it is expected that M&E Officers from the SRPMO level up to the NPMO level periodically check on the activation of the CM systems in Program areas, and extend technical assistance, as necessary.

Program Monitoring:

Grievance Monitoring

The Grievance Redress System (GRS) is a salient feature of KC-NCDDP that promotes social accountability and responsiveness to its beneficiary communities. This mechanism was designed to attend to complaints, problems and issues that arise from Program implementation; as such, the system should be installed at the initial stage of the CEAC, starting from the Municipal Orientation. Issues may include misuse of funds and allegations of corruption; inappropriate intervention by outside parties (in making decisions, determining allocations, in procurement etc.); and violation of project policies, principles or procedures, among others. It also responds to simple requests for information to clear up a misunderstanding.

The system upholds transparency and accountability and demonstrates the commitment of the Program to provide opportunities for the empowerment of communities. It is for this reason that the system ensures the participation of the Barangay Assembly (BA) and volunteers in the handling and redress of grievances. Below are the principles of the GRS:

- transparent and participatory
- Socially inclusive and open
- Institutional capacity-building for good governance
- Simple and accessible
- Quick and proportional action
- Objective and independent
- Anonymity and security
- Due process

Program Monitoring:

The system groups grievances, comments and queries into three, categorized mainly according to the level of authority delegated to address or resolve them.

Grievance Monitoring

- Type A – refer to the non-contentious queries, comments and suggestions.
- Type B – refer to issues on compliance with project processes, MOA, and other KC implementation arrangements; and
- Type C – refer to issues on conformance with KC-NCDDP procurement and financial guidelines.

Meanwhile, main activities under the GRS likewise fall under three components:

- installation in KC-NCDDP areas;
- monitoring and feedback to grievance senders on KC-NCDDP action; and
- incorporation of GRS monitoring reports in the regular KC-NCDDP progress report.

While various parties are involved in the GRS along its abovementioned components, select staff in the various levels are designated as Grievance Monitors who are authorized to receive and intake these grievances. Details on the operation of the KC-NCDDP GRS are found in Annex C.

Means of filing grievances:

Letters; E-mails; Text messages; Verbal narration from walk-in complainants; Phone calls; Suggestion boxes to be placed in non-political/religious institutions; Reports on visits to project offices and sites by project staff, independent monitors, supervision teams, government officials, or any interested persons or special groups like IPs, elderly, etc.; Reports of staff, consultants, NGOs, LGUs and journalists; Findings of WB supervision missions; Call in questions, comments or complaints from radio programs; Media newscasts, newspaper articles, and other publications

Grievances can be filed anonymously

The GRM manual did not specifically state the acknowledgment mechanism but the GRM tracks the grievances through the online GRM system.

“Information materials such as brochures, tarpaulin or posters should be present in the area. The materials should contain information regarding the GRS and contact numbers or hotline of DSWD NCDDP Office at all levels and should be translated into local dialect.” (page 8, GRM manual)

Timetable for processing grievances: 5 to 60 days depending on the type of grievance

Geo-Tagging

Geo-tagging is mainly used to improve operational monitoring of projects and activities in KC-NCDDP. However, the most important gain from the geo-tagging technique is that it allows the Program to represent community projects, critical facilities and influence areas on a GIS map, conveying the actual conditions and additional needs of the community for better decision-making. Other benefits from geo-tagging and GIS mapping are as follows:

- Identify vulnerable and at-risk population and facilities within the community
- Able to share geo-tagged data sets through a web-based mapping application which would

lead to better situation analysis at the field level

- Combine all data sets from other poverty reduction programs of DSWD and NGAs to allow more comprehensive development analysis

ACTs and MCTs conduct the field work for the geo-tagging of KC-NCDDP activities and sub-projects, which must be packaged according to Guidelines (Annex E). The M&E Officers of the SRPMO and RPMO act as auditors of the geo-tagging output from the field. They are expected to prepare summary tables and write-ups on the conducted field work. Furthermore, the RPMO converts to GIS the geo-tagged data received, and submits these to the NPMO. The NPMO GIS administrators will consolidate all geo-tagged files, upload them online, and overlay them in the geodatabase.

Protocol on the actual geo-tagging varies on the type of community projects. Briefly stated, projects are categorized on how they should be symbolized on a map:

1. Point- day care center, multi-use building, public market, school building, etc.
2. Linear- farm-to-market road, drainage, flood control, road concreting, etc.
3. Non-permanent- boat construction, community transport, etc.
4. Feasibility studies
5. KC-NCDDP activities- barangay assembly, capacity building, etc.

**Program
Evaluation:
Internal
Evaluation
– Municipal
Talakayan**

The Municipal Talakayan (or simply, Talakayan) is an M&E tool designed to measure overall development of KC municipalities. It is an annual (end-of-cycle) activity which brings together the local stakeholders (community citizens, local government officials and organized local groups) into a municipal-level democratic dialogue providing a venue to discuss their development situation, issues and identify plans to address the identified development gaps.

Operationally, the Talakayan is conceptualized as both a diagnostic and capacity-building tool. As a diagnostic tool, it captures and assesses a “snapshot” of the conditions and level of development of the municipality by measuring indicators on the aspects of local governance, poverty reduction and people empowerment. As a capacity-building tool, it intends to enhance awareness and appreciation of the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders in the development process. It is thus expected to build local capacities in results-based participatory M&E through knowledge generation, sharing, and collaborative self-assessment among stakeholders.

The Talakayan has the following specific objectives: (i) to increase local stakeholders’ awareness of development status in the municipality; (ii) to provide a venue for systematic face-to-face feedback from stakeholders; (iii) to promote the use of information at the local level to support better planning and reporting of outcomes; and (iv) to clarify experiential lessons learned. Aside from the

achievement of these objectives, the output of the activity is the “Municipal Talakayan Report” which contains analysis of the whole Talakayan data and experiences which serves as a guiding document for the LGUS and input to KALAHI-CIDSS program implementation as well.

As a key implementation strategy, the Talakayan engages third-party partner/s (local academic/research institution, non-government organization, or individual consultant) to strengthen the LGU-Third Party collaborations supporting the provisions of the Local Government Code in promoting good governance.

**Third Party
Evaluation**

At the national level, the mechanism for promoting third-party evaluation of KC-NCDDP by civil society groups is already in place through the KC-NCDDP steering committee, TWG and other consultation mechanisms. These existing national-level mechanisms shall be utilized for engaging civil society groups who might be interested in the KC third-party monitoring and evaluation.

At the sub-national level, the KC-NCDDP shall perform the following activities to promote the third- party monitoring and evaluation: (i) seek out local civil society groups, by establishing points of contact through making an inventory of civil society organizations operating at the provincial and regional levels where KC implementation is active, (ii) hold regional and provincial-level face-to-face info dissemination and discussion meetings with civil society organizations, (iii) involve NGOs and CSOs in local project assessments of the KC-NCDDP together with communities and LGUs, (v) conduct lessons sharing activities, and (vi) explore other strategies, activities and platforms for third- party monitoring and evaluation in KC.

Capacity Building and Implementation Support (CBIS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DSWD shall deploy process and technical facilitators - Facilitators shall provide advice during the ff. community activities: community assembly meetings; coordination and interfacing meetings with local government staff and officials; orientation and training of community volunteers, local government staff and external service providers assisting the communities - Facilitators will also work closely with counterpart staff from the municipal local government units and take part in local coordination activities of the sector and other programs present in the municipality
Project administration, monitoring and evaluation	<p>Support activities at the PMO national and regional levels shall be implemented: a) engaging specialized technical and process specialists and support staff at the PMO levels to support community, LGU and program implementors in the field; b) purposive and continuing capacity building and training for facilitators, trainers, program staff and local governments; c) information capture and wide data sharing to support decision-making, learning and strategic communications at various levels and for reporting purposes, as elaborated below under monitoring and evaluation; d) closer and more strategic coordination and convergence internally within the DSWD and with sector government agencies, CSOs and other partners; e) continuing improvement of internal management systems for on time and quality delivery of logistics support for staff and program activities in the field; and f) other relevant activities supporting local capability building, planning, implementation, coordination, learning, and monitoring and evaluation</p>

Annex 2: KALAHI Key Performance Indicators

Source: M&E Sub-manual, pp. 14-15, https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/Media/uploads/Kalahi_CIDSS_M_E_Sub_Manual.pdf

Outcome Indicators (Consolidated KPIs)

- Households benefiting from sub-projects
- % of HHs that report better access to services
- % increase in access to and utilization of roads, education, health centers and water (major KC-NCDDP investments) in KC-NCDDP municipalities
- % of HHs in KC-NCDDP municipalities that report increase in confidence to participate in community development activities
- % of members from marginalized (IPs, women) groups in KC-NCDDP municipalities that attend regular Barangay Assemblies
- % of HHs in KC-NCDDP municipalities with at least one member attending regular Barangay Assembly

Intermediate Outcome Indicators per Program component

Component 1: Barangay Grants - Communities plan and use barangay grants effectively

- % of KC-NCDDP barangays with poverty reduction action plans prepared, involving community members in accordance with the KC-NCDDP participatory process
- % of KC-NCDDP community projects completed in accordance with technical plans, schedule and budget
- % of completed KC-NCDDP projects that meet basic financial standards based on KCNCDDP Finance and Administration Sub- Manual
- % of completed KC-NCDDP projects that have satisfactory or better sustainability evaluation rating
- % of the paid labor jobs created by the project are accessed by women
- No. of reconstructed or repaired shelters for disaster-affected HHs

Component 2: Capacity-building and Implementation Support - More inclusive and transparent planning and budgeting at municipal and provincial levels

- KC-NCCDP Plan for strategic capacity building of community volunteers, NGAs, CSOs and other partners implemented
- No. of KC-NCDDP municipalities with LGUs staff trained by DILG using the local governance modules
- % of KC-NCDDP municipalities with municipal poverty reduction plans prepared in accordance with KC-NCDDP participatory process
- % of KC-NCDDP municipalities with citizens, other than public officials, who participate in municipal-level prioritization forum
- % of KC-NCDDP municipalities that provide LCC based on their LCC delivery plan
- % of KC-NCDDP municipalities with increased membership of POs and CSOs in local development councils and special bodies (BDC, local school board, PTCA, local health board, peace and order councils)
- % of registered grievances satisfactorily resolved in line with the GRS
- No. of KC-NCDDP provinces with provincial poverty reduction plans prepared in accordance with pilot-test of NCDDP PLGU process
- No. of community volunteers per barangay trained in CDD
- % of leadership positions in community volunteer committees are held by women by 2017

Component 3: Program Management and M&E

- KC-NCDDP PIMS providing necessary information in a timely fashion to measure project effectiveness and results
- KC-NCDDP multi-stakeholder oversight and coordinating committees in place and functional in accordance with TORs
- No. of KC-NCDDP studies on effectiveness and outcomes completed, with a review of gender equality dimensions by 2017

- System for community fund request fully operational at national and regional levels
- % of targeted new KC-NCDDP municipalities generate sex-disaggregated data
- Gender action plan implemented

Annex 3: Assessment Studies, Methodology and Indicators Used

ASSESSMENT STUDY	METHODOLOGY	INDICATORS USED
<p>World Bank. (2013). <i>Philippines - the KALAHI-CIDSS impact evaluation: A synthesis report</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quantitative: 2,400 households in 135 barangays in 16 municipalities in 4 provinces - Qualitative: focus group discussions, key informant interviews and direct observations, took place in a subset of 20 barangays in 4 municipalities in 2 provinces. 	<p>Household welfare</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Per capita consumption (overall, poor households, and non-poor households) - Poverty levels - Non-food share to total consumption - Labor force participation <p>Access to services</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Year-long road access - Visits to health stations - Access to water - School enrollment <p>Social capital and local governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Contribution to community projects - Others are willing to help - Group membership, participation in barangay assemblies, and collective action
<p>Labonne, J., & Chase, R.S. (2009). Who is at the wheel when communities drive development? Evidence from the Philippines. <i>World Development</i> 37(1), 219-231. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.05.006.</p>	<p>Quantitative</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Household and elected village leader survey (2,400 households in 132 villages, in 16 municipalities, in four provinces) 	<p>Poverty status, access to basic services, social capital, and local governance</p> <p>Preferences and proposal selection (community vs. local elected leader)</p>

Asian Development Bank. (2016). *Enhancing community-driven development through convergence: A case study of household- and community-based initiatives in Philippine villages*

Field research / visit

- Individual interviews and focus group discussions with respondents drawn from four groups of informants: (i) local implementation staff members of the KC-NCDDP initiative and other national government sector agencies; (ii) officials of local government units at both the municipal and barangay levels in the municipalities under study; (iii) barangay project management teams (of KC- NCDDP and non-KC-NCDDP projects); and (iv) selected community residents. In addition, the research team also interviewed KC-NCDDP regional project management teams in the regions in which the three study municipalities are located.

Desk review of relevant documents

- Participation of staff from the Bottom-Up Budgeting program and agencies assisting in the KC-NCDDP participatory situation analysis exercise at the barangay level
- Use of results from the participatory situation analysis by staff from the Bottom-Up Budgeting program and other agencies as a basis for community development planning
- Procedures for assignment of barangay-level projects to the KC-NCDDP initiative, the Bottom-Up Budgeting program, and other agencies
- Participation of staff from the KC-NCDDP initiative and the local poverty reduction action team
- Participation of staff from the KC-NCDDP initiative, the Regional Inter-Agency Committee, and the regional poverty reduction action team
- Acceptance of KC-NCDDP procedures by Bottom-Up Budgeting program agencies, municipality- and barangay-level local government unit officials with regard to
 - (i) community procurement,
 - (ii) community force accounts,
 - (iii) community-managed project implementation, and
 - (iv) community management of funds.
- Local government unit support of KC-NCDDP convergence at the
 - (i) municipal level, and
 - (ii) barangay level.
- Number of community-identified projects funded or implemented

<p>Wong, S. (2012). <i>What have been the impacts of World Bank community-driven development programs?</i>. Washington: The World Bank</p>	<p>Literature review</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Impacts of socioeconomic welfare - Poverty targeting - Access and utilization of services - Social capital and governance - Conflict - Cost effectiveness and rates of return
<p>University Research Company. (2016). <i>Assesment of Kalahi-CIDSS subprojects in the Philippines: Subproject utility and sustainability</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Desk review of documents per subproject in the sample - Field visits: Visual inspections/ observations, FGDs, KIs - Forum on results and recommendations 	<p>Community-based organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Institutionalization of the O&M Committee/Organization - Resources for continued operation - Women involvement - Existing coordination or linkages with other relevant organizations/ structures in the community <p>Asset management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key factors that ensure quality construction - Respondents' level of satisfaction with the physical and financial viability of the subprojects and services provided - Respondents' preparedness to contribute to the O&M of subprojects - Capacity building for maintenance of the subproject - Finances and resources in place to support maintenance - Environmental issues are addressed - Gender Issues are addressed <p>Governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy support - Local investment support - Integration of SP in the local development plan - Linkage support with other community mechanisms or organizations - GAD training - Access to GAD budget

Asian Development Bank. (2012). *The KALAHI-CIDSS Project in the Philippines: Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development*

- Desk review of documents
- FGDs
- Survey of residents in 6 prioritized villages

Community participation

- Extent of residents' participation and influence in the selection of community subprojects
- Participation of women, indigenous peoples, and the poorest in the community
- Contributions of community volunteers
- Major strengths and weaknesses of barangay assemblies as a mechanism for discussion and decision making
- Major strengths and weaknesses of the municipal inter-barangay forum and subproject criteria in the selection of subprojects
- Sentiments of nonprioritized villages

Utility and sustainability of subprojects

- Extent that subproject addresses needs of residents
- Beneficial effects of subprojects on the low incomes of community residents
- Respondents' perception of the quality of subproject construction
- Key factors that ensure quality construction
- Respondents' level of satisfaction with the physical and financial viability of the subprojects and services provided
- Key factors that ensure effective O&M
- Local government support for the O&M of subprojects
- Respondents' preparedness to contribute to the O&M of subprojects

Accountability and transparency

- Capability of community residents to hold local government officials accountable for financial resources
- Perceived extent of corruption in KALAHI-CIDSS

CAccountability and transparency

- Capability of community residents to hold local government officials accountable for financial resources
- Perceived extent of corruption in KALAHI-CIDSS
- Effectiveness of the Grievance Redress System and other KALAHI-CIDSS measures to prevent or limit corruption
- Extent of involvement in the decision making of local officials

Institutional impacts

- Extent that principles and practices of community-driven development (CDD), including participatory planning, community control of decisions and resources, community involvement in implementation, and community-based monitoring and evaluation, have been incorporated in municipal and village planning and implementation processes
- Constraints of LGUs in the adoption of CDD principles and practices
- LGU resource mobilization strategies to generate additional funds to support CDD activities
- Improvements in the formulation and content of local development plans

Notes

- 1 Borras, Saturnino Jr. 1999. *The Bibingka Strategy in Land Reform Implementation: Autonomous Peasant Movements and State Reformists in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy. 'Bibingka Strategy' was coined by Borras as a Philippine application of "Sandwich Strategy" developed by Fox (1992). *The Politics of Food in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bibingka Strategy posits that reforms are best won through the "symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups from below and state reformists from above", it can be said that BuB was "cooking a lot of rice cakes" with the "fire from the top."
- 2 The HDPRC included the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
- 3 <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P077012>
- 4 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/901691468759260347/text/multi0page.txt>
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P077012>
- 7 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/988911468295521363/pdf/564270ISDS0PH0KALAH1CI DSS0rev.pdf>
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/863941468024305578/pdf/RAD136296593.pdf>
- 10 <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P127741>
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 <https://www.adb.org/projects/46420-002/main>
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P161833>
- 15 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/35 ; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/24
- 16 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/25
- 17 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/36
- 18 <https://www.adb.org/projects/46420-002/main>
- 19 <https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/section-phl-ccr-kalahi-cidss-project> & https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/22

20 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/23

21 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/26

22 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/34

23 Department of Social Welfare and Development, Presentation in G-Watch National Meeting and Learning Exchange, November 2019; https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/projects_profile/41

24 Barangays are the smallest administrative units in the Philippines. It is the native Filipino term for village.

25 Representatives from the following could observe the forum: Local legislative body, local government unit department heads, regional office of national government agencies, civil society engaged in KALAHI and local media and universities.

26 See https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=18&q=SBN-1057

27 In the inter-barangay forum, barangay representatives present their proposals and then vote for the “best and most urgent.” The votes are strictly based on a set of criteria that the barangay representatives have set.

28 The Liga ng mga Barangay is the association of barangays at all levels of government: municipal, city, provincial to national. The head of the barangays (barangay captain/ punong barangay) or his/ her representative sits in the Liga. Among them, they elect the representative to the sanggunian/ council of each level - barangays of one municipality elect the representative of their barangays to the council of that municipality and so forth. They also elect their Board which is mandated by the Liga By-Laws to meet every month. Meeting of the entire membership of the Liga/ Assembly depends on request or can be set by the Board President. https://www.dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/reports_resources/DILG-Resources-2013126-2371594f6e.pdf

29 G-Watch is formerly a social accountability program of a university that has rebooted into a national citizen action and research for accountability. The writers belong to G-Watch. See here for more information: www.g-watch.org.

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