

Case Study – July 2022

The Sandwich Strategy: Opening from Above Meets Mobilization from Below in Monitoring the Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Program

Oladeji Olaore

About Accountability Research Center (ARC)

The Accountability Research Center (ARC) is an action-research incubator based in the School of International Service at American University. ARC partners with civil society organizations and policy reformers in the global South to improve research and practice in the field of transparency, participation and accountability. See: www.accountabilityresearch.org.

About Sandwich Strategy Research

This case is published in a series of studies that contribute to ARC's comparative analysis of "sandwich strategy" reforms, with support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's on Nigeria program. For additional cases, see: <https://www.macfound.org/press/grantee-publications/top-down-ground-up-creating-accountability-with-sandwich-strategies>.

"Sandwich strategies" are interactive processes in which reformers in government tangibly enable citizen action from below, potentially bolstering coalitions for change. This comparative study seeks to identify diverse reform pathways, roadblocks and outcomes. See: <https://accountabilityresearch.org/sandwich-strategy-research/>.

About ARC Publications

ARC publications serve as a platform for accountability strategists and researchers to share their experiences and insights with diverse readers across issue areas and sectors. These publications frame distinctive local and national initiatives in terms that engage with key issues in the transparency, participation and accountability field.

Rights and Permissions



The material in this publication is copyrighted under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Unported license (CC BY 4.0) <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>. Under the Creative Commons Attribution license, you are free to copy, distribute, transmit, and adapt this work, including for commercial purposes, under the following conditions:

Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: Olaore, Oladeji. 2022. "The Sandwich Strategy: Opening from Above Meets Mobilization from Below: Monitoring the Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Program." *Case Study*. Accountability Research Center.

Translation—If you create a translation of this work, please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution: This translation was not created by the Accountability Research Center (ARC) and should not be considered an official ARC translation. ARC shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.

Notes on Support

Support for ARC comes from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Foundations, and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. ARC's work is also made possible by institutional support from the School of International Service, American University.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the following people for their support and contributions while researching this case study. Late Mrs Banke Akinrimisi (former Executive Director, CEWHIN) Atinuke Odukoya, Sumbo Odukoya, Tolulope Aderibigbe, and Nathaniel Emmanuel. Sincere appreciation also goes to Mrs Tinuola Shopeju (former Special Adviser to Ogun state governor on Special Projects & Program Manager OGHGSFP) and all CEWHIN monitors at the three LGAs interviewed during the study.

About the Author

Dr. Oladeji Olaore is a democracy and governance professional. He has conducted extensive applied research on governance, accountability, Public Financial Management, and citizen engagement initiatives in Sub Saharan Africa and other parts of the world. He is dedicated international development expert with a demonstrated history of empowering local partners in challenging environments to improve the lives of citizens through more inclusive, transparent, and accountable polities. He studied communications and public policy at the University of Ibadan and University of Pittsburgh. He holds a doctoral degree in Information Systems and Communications from the Robert Morris University, Pittsburgh. He has consulted extensively for the World Bank, USAID, European Union, as well as for international NGOs (National Democratic Institute, IBP, Counterpart International, Tetra Tech International).

Contents

Introduction	5
Background on the Home-Grown School Feeding Program	6
Trigger for State Action	7
Opening from Above	8
Response from Social Actors	10
Roadblocks	14
Outcomes of Monitoring the School Feeding Program	17
Conclusion	21
References	24
Notes.....	25

Introduction

This case study analyzes the monitoring of the Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Program (HGSFP) from different perspectives. The HGSFP is one of the five programs of the Nigerian federal government's National Social Investment Programme, initiated in 2016 under President Buhari. The goal of the national HGSFP is to provide meals at school for children in first through third grades using locally produced foods. In the case of Ogun, national civil society organizations (CSOs) in collaboration with community-based organizations seized the opportunity of a negotiated space created by reformers within government and with the support from MacArthur Foundation to promote transparency and accountability in the HGSFP. The school feeding monitoring program increased the capacity of the local Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and School Based Management Committees (SBMCs), made some head teachers feel compelled to be more transparent and accountable in the administration of the PTAs' funds, and led to an increase in the protein portion size provided to students.

A cohort of four CSOs supported by the MacArthur Foundation worked collaboratively to monitor the HGSFP in Ogun with the aim of improving transparency and accountability in the system: Action Health Incorporated (AHI), Centre for Women's Health and Information (CEWHIN), Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON), and The Education Partnership (TEP) Centre. The first three organizations worked in eleven local government areas, through a network of community stakeholders to monitor the day-to-day implementation of the Ogun HGSFP in selected schools. The TEP Centre provided continuous capacity development support on the government side (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021). The cohort initially planned to monitor 140 schools across nine local government areas in Ogun State, out of roughly 1550 primary schools across twenty local government areas. AHI monitored sixty schools while CEWHIN and WOCON each covered forty schools. The idea of CSOs monitoring the HGSFP was part of the MacArthur Foundation's 'On Nigeria' project, which seeks to promote accountability, transparency, and good governance in Nigeria by reducing retail corruption and strengthening Nigerian-led anti-corruption efforts (CEWHIN 2018). This effort was distinct from other, parallel monitoring efforts of the National Social Investment Programme carried out by other CSOs and independent monitors.

The program manager for the Ogun State HGSFP provided the 'opening from above' by granting permission to AHI, WOCON, and CEWHIN to monitor the school feeding program in the state. She took concrete steps to support monitoring the school feeding program by writing letters of introduction to the education secretaries in all local government areas covered by the monitors to inform them about the process. This particular action reduced the cost of citizen action by granting monitors unrestricted access to schools and head teachers, which would have been impossible without the letter of introduction. The introduction letter conferred official recognition of the state government on the monitors. The letter also enhanced effective collaboration among critical stakeholders within the school feeding ecosystem (the Ogun HGSFP Secretariat, education secretaries, CSOs, PTAs, SBMCs, head teachers, and cooks). In addition to access, the letter also increased information sharing between the monitors, government officials, and the cooks. Without the letter of introduction, no monitor would have been granted access to the schools, and no monitoring would have been possible.

The opening from above and the collective action from below by CSOs is an example of a sandwich strategy. The sandwich strategy describes efforts by a state actor to enable collective action to jointly pressure public sector actors for responsiveness and recognition in the name of achieving greater accountability and institutional change. The sandwich strategy relies on the mutually reinforcing interaction between pro-reform actors in both state and society, not just initiatives from one or the other arena. This case examines the opportunity created by the program manager and her team for CSOs to monitor the Ogun State HGSFP. The case details factors that motivated the state actor to create the opening, actions taken by the social actors, responses to the collective action (including backlash), and outcomes of the collective action.

This case study focuses on the monitoring efforts of CEWHIN. CEWHIN adopted a community-led approach to monitor the school feeding program in collaboration with members of PTAs and SBMCs. The school feeding monitoring exercise was initially marred by a contentious relationship between the monitors and state officials, including education secretaries, head teachers, and the cooks. This relationship was characterized by mistrust, fear, conflicts, and total rejection (at one point), which afterwards gradually developed into mutual respect, and acceptance of the monitors by state officials.

This case study traces the HGSFP's implementation from the state operations office to the education secretaries at local levels to monitoring of the program at selected schools in three specific local government areas covered by CEWHIN: Abeokuta South Local Government, Yewa South Local Government, and Odogbolu Local Government. The case study is based on an extensive literature review on the HGSFP in Nigeria as well as thirteen in-depth interviews conducted with key informants that included staff of the Ogun State HGSFP, education secretaries at the local government area level, CEWHIN staff, head teachers, health teachers, and cooks. A small group of monitors from each of the three local governments areas covered by CEWHIN also participated in focus group discussions in 2019. Two additional follow-up interviews with CEWHIN staff occurred in 2020 and 2021. Table 1 lists the interviews and the number by which the text refers to them. The goal of interviews and focus groups was to better understand actions taken by government officials as well as citizens, and the outcomes of these efforts.

Background on the Home-Grown School Feeding Program

School feeding programs in Nigeria have a long history. The federal government of Nigeria initially introduced a precursor to the HGSFP in 2004 through the Universal Basic Education Act. This program was initiated in collaboration with the New Partnership for African Development, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, and other international development partners. The Federal Ministry of Education launched the program in 2005 on a pilot basis in twelve states plus the Federal Capital Territory. Of the original pilot states, Osun is the only state still implementing the program.¹ Key outcomes from Osun's O'MEALS program have included: increases in enrollment and retention in primary schools; increased markets for poultry, fish, and cocoyam farmers; and employment opportunities for previously unemployed cooks (Aregbesola 2016).

Challenges that led to the rapid discontinuation of the pilot program included inadequate monitoring and evaluation, failure of the federal government and states to disburse funds, and limited community participation (Nigeria Home-Grown School Feeding Strategic Plan 2016–2020). With donor support, the federal government of Nigeria convened a high-level national advocacy meeting in May 2014 to review and develop a roadmap for implementing the HGSFP across Nigeria. Although the meeting recommended urgent action to establish the HGSFP, it made no reference to monitoring.

These experiences then informed the HGSFP component of the National Social Investment Programme implemented by the Buhari administration starting in 2016. The main objectives of the HGSFP are to:

1. Improve the enrolment and retention of primary school children;
2. Address the poor nutrition and health status of many children and thereby improve learning outcomes;
3. Increase local agricultural production and boost farmers' income by creating a viable and ready market; and
4. Create jobs along the value chain and provide a multiplier effect for economic growth and development.

Each state HGSFP was expected to be developed through a structured, rigorous, and collective analytical process, that took into consideration international standards and national guidelines on the HGSFP. The HGSFP program was designed to be monitored through the monitoring and evaluation departments of implementing agencies; the federal guidelines did not provide funding or instructions for citizen or third-party monitoring.

Trigger for State Action

Ogun State was among the first two states (along with Anambra) to implement the school feeding program in January 2017 after receiving federal government approval. To do so, the federal government required the state governor to appoint a program manager to head the HGSFP Secretariat. According to the federal government guidelines, the program manager could not be a politician, had to be a technocrat, and had to come from the private sector. In addition, the program's secretariat had to be located in the governor's office, outside all other ministries, making it an umbrella for the other agencies contributing to the HGSFP.

The appointment of Mrs. Tinuola Shopeju as program manager for the Ogun State HGSFP was a trigger for the sandwich strategy. She reported to the Commissioner of Special Duties who supervised the implementation of the state's school feeding program. Shopeju was motivated by her background in the private sector, where performance tends to be measured by results, and was determined to make the program a success. Shopeju explained that the state government welcomed and embraced the idea of monitoring the state's school feeding program by the CSOs because "we knew we have done terrifically a lot and we have brought a lot of innovation to the

program.”² She and her team were motivated to support monitoring because they felt Ogun State had accomplished a great deal through the implementation of the school feeding program. They believed that the state government had done a good job and wanted an opportunity to showcase these accomplishments. They also wanted to be transparent with all stakeholders about the monitoring process. For all these reasons, partnering with the MacArthur Foundation and its grantees to support monitoring was a welcome development.

The MacArthur Foundation approached the Ogun State government in December 2017 and proposed a plan to monitor the HGSFP in the state using its grantees. The MacArthur Foundation’s involvement enabled both the opening from above and the response from below. After the initial introduction by the MacArthur Foundation, the four involved CSOs jointly paid an advocacy visit to the state government to brief government officials and the HGSFP Secretariat about their programs. From the perspective of the CSOs, their independent monitoring of the HGSFP was also a good development for the state government because:

The school feeding program has been fraught with a lot of negative publicity in the media; either from it being dismissed as a mere electoral propaganda to outright unverified stories on the failures of the program. Ironically, several citizens were unaware of its existence, much less the modalities of its implementation. The inclusion of the cohort [of CSOs overseeing monitoring] was, therefore, needed to improve the capacities of government to provide accountability and also the capacities of the citizenry to demand for it, thereby ensuring the effective implementation of the HGSFP in the state (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021, 18).

The traditional rulers and community leaders provided a welcoming environment for the monitors. In some cases, the traditional rulers offered to host some of the meetings of the monitors at their palace. This gave high credibility to the project by the local community. “The host communities in the eleven intervention local governments embraced the support of the cohort organizations and this made the work of monitoring the school feeding program not just possible, but sustainable” (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021, 62). This demonstrated a high level of support and acceptance of the program by the host communities.

Opening from Above

The program manager took a number of steps to enable collective action by citizens in the monitoring of the HGSFP. Many of these related to the education secretaries, who are responsible for supervising the implementation of education policies at the local government level. They have direct oversight of all primary schools and head teachers in their local government area and report to the Director of Education/Commissioner at the State Ministry of Education. The education secretaries were the first point of contact for the monitors at the local level and introduced the monitors into the school system within their local government areas. In particular, the HGSFP program officer took the following steps to support the monitoring of the Ogun HGSFP:

- a. She wrote letter of introduction to education secretaries in all local government areas covered by the monitors to inform them about the process and request they support the monitors in their work.
- b. She instructed the education secretaries to grant the monitors access to the head teachers and cooks.
- c. She ensured that monitors had direct access to her and key officers at the HGSFP Secretariat, a very unusual move for a government official.
- d. She gave telephone numbers to the monitors of key staff working at the HGSFP Secretariat, including her own. The monitors were encouraged to call those numbers anytime to report any incident and she was very responsive to their complaints/reports.
- e. She also instructed the education secretaries to provide their contact information to the monitors working in the areas they covered.

The above actions conferred legitimacy and authority on the social actors. It also granted the monitors unrestricted access to the schools which enabled monitoring of the school feeding program. Otherwise, it would have been exceedingly difficult, if not practically impossible, for the CSOs to carry out the monitoring of the school feeding program. The education secretaries then introduced the CSOs to the head teachers and the cooks in each local government. The head teachers in turn facilitated development of effective working relationship between the CSOs and members of PTAs and SMBCs in their respective schools.³ The head teachers also introduced the monitors to the health teachers who oversaw and certified food prepared by the cooks, and collaborated with the monitors to ensure that the cooks followed all the school feeding guidelines and processes. One CEWHIN staff member summarized the effect of the introduction of the CSOs by the HGSFP Secretariat to the local government areas as follows:

We could have encountered serious problems at the [local government areas] and at the schools if the homework has not been done properly. MacArthur Foundation introduced us to the state officials, we were embraced by the Home-Grown office. The Home-Grown office gave instructions to people at the other two levels. Home-Grown has contacted the [education secretaries], and the [education secretaries] contacted the schools. So, we don't have any major issues. It is only when they've not been contacted that you can't enter their schools; they will send you packing. But since the chain of command and communication have been cleared, everything went well.⁴

With the mandate from the HGSFP Secretariat, the CSOs had the authority to visit any of the schools assigned to them. In addition, they had access to records related to the school feeding program such as the number of pupils in each class and the number of pupils being fed. They could ask questions from the cooks, the health teachers, and the head teachers. Ordinarily, the schools would not share such information with anyone who was not a government official. According to CEWHIN officials, the greatest support to the monitoring exercise came from the program manager:

One thing we need to mention ... is the personality of the Program Manager. She is from the private sector. She is not a core civil servant, and she is not a politician. Very open woman, very free, very nice and ... she is a very friendly and approachable leader.⁵

The support from the HGSFP office thus facilitated increased information sharing between the monitors, government officials and cooks, which in turn allowed monitoring to occur.

Response from Social Actors

CEWHIN in collaboration with local PTAs and SBMCs stepped into the opening created by the HGSFP program manager and seized the opportunity to monitor the school feeding program. Activities of the monitors, particularly the PTA and SBMC members, ultimately went beyond the school feeding program and extended to cover day-to-day running of the schools.

The overarching goal of CEWHIN's monitoring program was to "promote accountability in public expenditure in the Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Program" (CEWHIN 2017). Therefore, in collaboration with community-based organizations, PTAs and SBMCs, CEWHIN engaged in series of activities that reduced the possibility of leakages and enhanced the quality of services offered by the school feeding program in Ogun State.

PTAs and SBMCs were two key school-based organizational entities crucial to the monitoring efforts led by CEWHIN. PTAs are membership organizations operating at every primary school in the state that include parents and teachers as members. Members of the association are viewed as critical stakeholders in the management of primary schools. One of the goals of PTAs is to support the administration of primary schools by providing donations to support development projects or school infrastructure. In addition, they are part of the decision-making process in implementing most development projects. The main source of funding for PTAs is through membership fees called the PTA levy. The PTA levy varies from school to school depending on location. For instance, PTAs at schools in urban/middle class neighborhoods are well-resourced compared to their counterparts in rural areas or poor communities. PTAs also accept donations, and depending on their members' networks, some PTAs have access to significant funds. The activities and influence of a PTA chapter depend on its resources, leadership, and relationship with the head teacher at the school.

SBMCs are government established committees intended to increase citizen participation in school management by giving community members a voice in the administration of primary schools in Nigeria. SBMCs are voluntary groups made up of people who represent the school community, and they include parents, community leaders, teachers, faith-based leaders, as well as other community-based interest groups. However, SBMCs were not set up in all schools monitored by CEWHIN.

At the beginning of the program, the state government allocated CEWHIN forty schools across three local governments in Ogun State: thirteen in Abeokuta South; thirteen in Odogbolu; and fourteen in Yewa South. Later, in response to community demands, CEWHIN expanded its programs to an additional three local government areas covering seventy-five more schools (CEWHIN 2019). CEWHIN recruited and deployed two volunteer, unpaid monitors to each school: either one PTA member and one SBMC member, or two PTA members if there was no SBMC.

CEWHIN strategically used PTAs and SBMCs in monitoring as it was easier for them than CEWHIN to build rapport with, as well as gain the confidence and trust of, the education secretaries, head teachers, cooks, and other stakeholders. Several stakeholders confirmed that the use of PTA and SBMC members to monitor the school feeding was beneficial because these organizations are part of the school system, their members live within the community, and they understand the environment. Involving PTAs and SBMCs in monitoring reflected CEWHIN's belief in the importance

of community participation and ownership in transforming the education sector. Involvement in monitoring gave these organizations an opportunity to be more engaged in the activities at their respective schools, thus highlighting their importance and relevance to the community.

Immediately after the recruitment process, CEWHIN sent letters to each school inviting the chairman of the PTA and SBMC to a two-day training on how to monitor the school feeding program. The first day of the training was devoted to civic responsibilities with a focus on citizens' rights and responsibilities, and strategies for engaging government officials. This aspect of the training relied on role-playing, drama, and other participatory methods. The second part of the training focused on how to monitor the HGSFP. During this session, CEWHIN invited staff from the HGSFP to give presentations about the program. According to CEWHIN's Executive Director, "we made it clear to them that we cannot speak authoritatively about the program, so we need people from Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Program office to make the presentations."⁶

The HGSFP Secretariat sent their staff to the training to explain the objectives of the program, its guidelines, and its procedures. In addition, "they told them the dos and don'ts of the monitors. For instance, they were told that as monitors, they are there to observe and make recommendations, and not to challenge or fight with anyone in the school," explained CEWHIN's Executive Director.⁷ The monitors concurred with this description of the training:

We were told during the training that we don't have join issues with any [cook], our role is to write our reports. If there is any step to be taken about any [cook], our superiors or the people at the Home-Grown office know what to do.⁸

After the training, each pair of monitors began monitoring the HGSFP in their respective schools. In Abeokuta South Local Government, the monitors self-organized immediately after the training and appointed a chairman and other officers to lead the team. They visited the local education secretary to introduce themselves. According to the chairman of the monitors:

We went to introduce ourselves to the [education secretary] at the [local government area] Secretariat so that when we start going to different schools, nobody will challenge us. The officer fully welcomed us. In support of this initiative, the [education secretary] organized a meeting of all the [cooks] in the [local government area] and introduced us to the [cooks] so that they can understand that though we were recruited by CEWHIN, however, we have the backing of the Local Government Authority.⁹

Monitors in the other local government areas ultimately also organized themselves in a similar fashion, with elected leaders. Monitors' self-organization was so cohesive that if there was any issue/problem at any of the schools, monitors in charge of that school would contact the chairman of the monitors and other monitors for support. The monitors were able to resolve many challenges through this organizational approach, which allowed them to speak with one voice.

Armed with a monitoring checklist, the monitors went to their respective schools and introduced themselves to the head teachers as well as the health teachers in charge of monitoring the cooks. According to the monitors interviewed, they went to the designated schools between 9:00 to 9:30 am before the cooks arrived at 10:00 am. Once the cook arrived, the monitors would ask the health teacher to taste the food as required. Other processes they monitored included: the time the cooks arrived at the schools; whether the cook washed her hands before serving the food; the quality and quantity of the food served; the dress code of the cooks; the hygienic condition of the food;

and whether the cooks washed the pupils' food plates before and after eating. Furthermore, they monitored the number of pupils served and the number of pupils absent.

After this, the monitors then completed a checklist that recorded their observations and shared the completed checklist with the head teacher for endorsement and discussion. Monitors were expected to visit their respective schools at least twice a week, but some visited more frequently depending on their closeness to the schools. Occasionally, the monitors conducted unscheduled/surprise visits to the schools, which reports indicated kept the cooks on their toes.

Monitors from each local government area met regularly (as needed) to discuss issues/challenges arising from their monitoring activities. Monitors expended personal funds to attend these meetings at the local government area headquarters, some of which were five to fifteen km away from the monitors' homes. These meetings gave the monitors a collective identity and sense of belonging.

As part of its monitoring strategy, CEWHIN organized a monthly accountability forum in each of the local government areas where it monitored the HGSFP. The accountability forum provided the opportunity for monitors to provide feedback on their experiences from different schools. They used the forum to compare notes, identify patterns of behaviors, and develop strategies for addressing challenges. In particular, the accountability forum was intended to provide a platform for trained monitors to report on corrupt practices and acts of indiscipline observed during monitoring but not captured in the monitoring tools. The accountability forum also offered an opportunity for retraining monitors on the monitoring tools ("Report of The First Accountability Forum", 2018).

In addition, CEWHIN provided training to strengthen the capacity of SBMCs and PTAs, including modules such as "providing leadership for good governance," and "identifying and addressing retail corruption in the society," as well as discussion of strategies for engaging government officials ("Report of The First Accountability Forum", 2018). PTAs and SBMCs members were thus trained on anti-corruption mechanisms and skills for demanding accountability from elected officials in addition to how monitor the school feeding program.

Monitors had multiple reporting channels, both formal and informal. Whenever they observed an incident, they first documented it and shared it with the head teacher. Then the report was forwarded to CEWHIN. It was the responsibility of CEWHIN to communicate the incident to the HGSFP Secretariat for immediate action. The monitors could also report directly to the HGSFP office through their chairman. According to the chairman of one of the monitoring groups:

We normally report whatever happened to CEWHIN. After reporting to CEWHIN, I will then call the Home-Grown Secretariat. We have direct access to the Home-Grown Secretariat and the education secretary at the [local government area]. As soon as the report gets to the Operations Manager, she will call the school concerned and invite them immediately. That's why I called her the iron lady. And likewise, anytime the report gets to the [education secretary] at the [local government area], they quickly act on it.¹⁰

Each accountability forum also produced feedback forwarded to the project working group, which in turn forwarded these recommendations to the HGSFP Secretariat for necessary actions. The project working group included representatives from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Budget and Planning, the HGSFP Project Manager, CEWHIN's Program Officer, two associates of

CEWHIN, one member of a CSO, and a representative of a PTA or SBMC from each local government. The objective of the project working group was to “address technical issues and take policy decision on the different aspects of the project implementation” (CEWHIN 2017). According to CEWHIN’s executive director, “we are the only organization [among those funded by the MacArthur Foundation] that built the project working group and accountability forum into our proposal. We had used them in the past, and we know that they are very effective in project implementation.”¹¹

One factor that sustained citizens’ voluntary participation in monitoring was the prestige and respect accorded the monitors in their communities. Various accounts from members of the PTAs and SBMCs indicated that their activities were more visible as monitors and this earned them recognition and respect from local government officials, local school authorities, and members of their communities. When asked what motivated them to participate in monitoring the school feeding program pro bono, the answers from the monitors were unanimous across board. For example, “We are not after monetary rewards; we are only concerned about the future of our children and the progress of our nation.”¹² In his own account, the chairman of the monitors in Yewa South Local Government Area said, “Whatever I do, I do it for the benefits of my community.”¹³

T-shirts provided by CEWHIN also boosted the monitors’ courage. The T-shirt served as their uniform, and they wore it anytime they went out to the schools. More importantly, the T-shirts also served as a symbol of authority and recognition for the monitors. Explaining the significance of the T-shirts, one of the monitors said:

First people recognized us as the Home-Grown School Feeding monitors.... They see us as government officials monitoring the [cooks]. But I tell people that we are working for the community because the children belong to our community. So whenever we put on this uniform people respect us... The inscriptions at the back of the T-shirts command respect.¹⁴

Another monitor recounted his personal experience that anytime he wore the uniform, the police officers at the check points accorded him special respect.

When I put on that uniform, anytime we come to a police check point, the officers there looked at me with admiration. It has happened to me several times. For me, that takes the respect I earned from doing this job to another level. I am proud to wear the uniform anytime.”¹⁵

There was thus a deep sense of pride and fulfilment among the monitors for participating in the exercise.

Benefitting the children of the community also motivated participation in monitoring the school feeding program. According to one monitor, “my biological child is among those children, so also are the children of my extended families that live in the same community. All these pupils are our children, so I see this assignment as a way of giving back to the community.”¹⁶ The chairman of the monitors in Abeokuta South shared the same sentiment. He said, “I believe that whatever we can do voluntarily to develop our community, we should go ahead and do it. That is service to humanity, and this spirit of service cut across all our PTAs and SBMCs members, because we can call upon anyone of them anytime.”¹⁷ These testimonies indicated that PTA and SBMC members had high stakes in the schools because their children or their relatives’ children attended the schools. These people were motivated by the passion to serve and the opportunity to give back to their communities.

Another critical factor that sustained citizens' action was the positive feedback and cooperation they received from the HGSFP Secretariat. Secretariat staff provided the monitors their phone numbers to report incidents, giving monitors a sense of responsibility and importance. Above all, monitors had a sense of fulfilment and accomplishment when they knew that their feedback could actually improve program implementation.

Roadblocks

State government bureaucracy was a major factor that slowed down monitoring efforts. Several layers of approval processes and procedures in the civil service delayed the release of the letters of introduction to the monitors for about three months. Part of the delay was due to the fact that the program manager needed to get clearance from the Commissioner for Special Duties (the supervisor of the program manager), and this took some time.

Secondly, at this point, state government officials were still skeptical of the motive of the CSOs in monitoring the school feeding program and thus afraid about how information from monitoring would be used (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021). Hence, government officials were very cautious about the new "partnership" with CSOs. In particular, education secretaries did not trust CSOs and their partners. They limited the access of the monitors to specific schools, which invariably restricted their monitoring action. In addition to lack of trust, the civil servants did not want monitors to expose any ineffectiveness or ineptitude, and so some education secretaries initially described the monitors as "troublemakers."¹⁸

No sooner had the monitors started visiting various schools to monitor the school feeding program that there was push back from the cooks. The cooks ganged up in some local government areas to report the monitors to education secretaries and other political appointees, which led to temporary suspension of the activities of the monitors. The motive behind this resistance was that the majority of the cooks were not actually complying with state guidelines on food preparation, food timetables, or procedures for serving the food. The cooks described the monitors as "thorn in their flesh."¹⁹ Cooks started to question the monitors' legitimacy, asking "What is happening? Who are these people?"²⁰ According to the chairman of the monitors in Abeokuta South Local Government, some of the cooks were politically connected, and started spreading rumors among their political networks that the monitors have been paid by the opposition party to destroy the program of the ruling party. "This really caused some problems for us as monitors"²¹ he stated. In addition, the monitors were accused of monitoring the school feeding in other schools not allocated to them by the government.

This issue created a serious friction between the monitors, the education secretary, and the HGSFP Secretariat. The situation deteriorated quickly to the point that all monitors in Abeokuta South Local Government were barred from entering any school within the local government. Similarly, the education secretary's enthusiasm to support the activities of the monitors diminished because she was afraid of the influence wielded by the cooks. As is common among civil servants, she was afraid of being reported to her supervisors, which might have a negative effect on her job. The

chairman of the monitors in the local government area explained that some of the challenges were due to lack of understanding of the process and its purpose by both sides. According to him, “in this type of situation, one cannot do without stepping on each other’s toes.”²²

When the HGSFP Secretariat heard about the cooks’ reaction to monitoring, the program manager called a meeting of the monitors, the cooks, and other stakeholders, and explained everyone’s roles and responsibilities. According to the chairman of the monitors:

It was the intervention of the program manager that eased the tension between monitors and the [cooks]. During the meeting, she made it clear to everybody that CEWHIN is not doing anything on their own, but Ogun State government is working in collaboration with CEWHIN. She further stated that whatever we [the monitors] are doing has the support of Home-Grown Office. It was after this meeting that the situation improved between the monitors and the [cooks].²³

The meeting drastically reduced the tension between the cooks and the monitors. CEWHIN also used the initial opposition of the cooks to dialogue with the HGSFP office on how to establish a better working relationship between the HGSFP office and the monitors. According to CEWHIN’s program officer:

That incident opened the space for dialogue between CEWHIN and the Home-Grown office. We just wanted their works to go on. We don’t want to cause problem for them. CEWHIN does not want to undermine anybody’s authority nor bypass their administrative hierarchy.²⁴

After a series of dialogues, the HGSFP Secretariat advised that monitors should restrict themselves to the schools assigned to them to prevent conflicts. They asked monitors not to go to schools not allocated to CEWHIN because “there were complaints that CEWHIN monitors are giving government headache.”²⁵ Similar conflicts occurred between the education secretaries, cooks, and the monitors in other local government areas. One of the education secretaries narrated that when the program first started, some of the monitors were overzealous:

The issue was that the monitors wanted to overdo their assignment, and it was reported to us. You can’t just jump into a school and go straight to the [cook] when the teachers are there. Even though you’re a PTA chairman or SBMC member, it is appropriate to let the teachers in the school know who you are and your mission in the school on that particular day. We told them that we don’t want them to go beyond their boundaries, if you’re to monitor school A stay in school A, don’t go to school B.²⁶

According to the education secretary, a meeting was convened between CEWHIN officials and the monitors where these issues were discussed and resolved. CEWHIN was advised to talk to their monitors to limit their activities to the approved schools. “I am not against what they are doing but I just want them to be where they are assigned to.”²⁷

Ultimately, actions of the education secretaries changed over time when they realized that the monitors’ actions complemented their work. As a result, the education secretaries began to provide required support to the monitors, and even advocated for them to be deployed to other schools under their jurisdiction. Similarly, the cooks changed their actions/attitudes towards the monitors when they realized that the monitors helped them to resolve some of the problems they encountered with government, such as unreasonable deductions from their payments, non-timely payment of their money, and challenges with their ATM cards.

Another obstacle faced by monitors was lack of funds to travel from one location to the other. Monitors were not paid any stipend to cover the cost of transportation from their home to various schools, and some of them lived far away from these locations. The monitors thus not only volunteered their time, but also their personal resources for transportation.

Another major challenge to the monitoring process related to the HGSFP program more broadly. During a live radio discussion with the Vice President of Nigeria in 2018, one of the callers said that the federal government school feeding program was “a hoax” and that “no child was feeding in Ogun State,” the home state of the Vice President. In an effort to correct this embarrassing situation, the program manager immediately embarked upon an on-the-spot check of the school feeding program with journalists. In one of the schools she visited in Abeokuta South Local Government, she met the chairman of the monitoring group and his colleagues, monitoring the program. The chairman and his team were interviewed by journalists, and they confirmed that the school feeding program was progressing well in the state. This interview was broadcast live while the Vice President was still on the air. The independent corroboration by the monitors gave a huge boost and credibility to the school feeding program in the state, and it saved what could have been a “major embarrassment”²⁸ to both the federal and state governments. Henceforth, senior state government officials who had been less supportive of monitoring recognized the importance of the partnership with CSOs to monitor the school feeding program.

News about the monitors’ activities spread quickly, and some schools not assigned to CEWHIN started inviting the monitors to visit their schools. One of the monitors described the dramatic change in the working relationship between them and the government officials as follows:

Initially, we were not working together, because of this there was a problem. When we come with our reports, the [cooks] will come with different reports, this was causing conflicts. However, after it was explained to them [the cooks] that both the Home-Grown Office and the CEWHIN are working together, we find it easy and since then things have been working well.²⁹

The improved working relationship between the monitors and education secretaries was noticeable across the three local government areas. One of the education secretaries interviewed stated that the monitors were their partners. He observed that government needed the support of everyone in order to achieve the program’s objectives and went further to advocate for more monitors to be deployed across the local government area to cover the remaining primary schools: “Currently they monitor the program in fourteen schools out of ninety-four schools. Actually, we requested for more monitors because the exercise brings a lot of improvement to the program.”³⁰ Another education secretary observed that there was a good working relationship between the local government area and the monitors:

We are happy with what they are doing because they are helping us. We cannot do it alone; they are there to help us. They are at the grassroots, and they can monitor what is going on at grassroots level. They are doing a great job, so I will recommend that if they can extend their monitoring to other schools, that will really help us. Since we are working together, they always give us feedback. They do their monitoring; we do our monitoring and we all come back to compare notes.³¹

Through constant dialogue and collaborative efforts, the officials at the local government level accepted the monitors and the legitimacy and authority provided to them by the HGSFP office. As a result, the monitors were empowered, and this made their monitoring more effective.

Outcomes of Monitoring the School Feeding Program

Overall, the state government responded positively to the monitors' findings and recommendations and there is evidence that monitoring improved the quality of the HGSFP. Specifically, the rate of noncompliance indicated by monitors' reports declined significantly over time, from ninety-four percent in May–July 2018 to seventy-one percent in September–November 2018 and thirty percent in December 2018–February 2019 (CEWHIN 2019).

The HGSFP Secretariat took concrete steps to address some of the major problems identified by the monitors. According to CEWHIN's program officer:

In fairness to [the Secretariat], when we get certain complaints, and we inform them about it, they try to respond. I remembered when we got the report about the 'sim-card' size of the protein, and this report kept coming up. We informed the Home-Grown office and they said it was an embarrassment to them to compare the size of the protein they served pupils to a sim card. So, they called a meeting of the protein aggregators to inform them about the development, and asked them to do something about it. After the meeting, the size of the meat was increased to that of a bottled water cover.³²

In another instance, the monitors reported that several cooks complained that they did not understand how their money was being deducted. According to the CEWHIN officials,

When we received this complaint, we wanted to meet with Gateway Bank [the official bank through which the cooks were being paid], but the bank officials refused to meet with us. We reported the case to the Home-Grown office, they called a meeting and invited the bank officials to come and meet with the cooks to address this concern. The meeting was held and they provided detailed explanation to the cooks on how much was being deducted from their money and for what reasons.³³

Monitoring also helped solve issues with the cooks. One of the education secretaries explained that:

"There was a time [the monitors] reported to us that [cooks] were not keeping to the food timetable. I invited all the [cooks] for a meeting, and I talked to them about the complaints we received. There was another time I received a report about a [cook's] misconduct, I invited the concerned [cook] to my office, and I warned her. And if we observed that there are no changes based on my meeting with the [cook], I will report such cases to the Home-Grown office. For instance, there was a case when my staff went to monitor the program, they saw a [cook] serving low-quality food. The [cook] was brought to my office, and when I saw the food, it was nothing to write home about; ... I asked my staff to take her to Home-Grown office for necessary disciplinary actions and they commended our efforts.³⁴

In another example, one of the cooks was suspended for collecting money but failing to cook regularly for the pupils or follow the approved food timetable when she did cook.

When I got this report, I reported the case to the education secretary. The following day, the [education secretary] sent his staff to the school, and they caught the woman red-handed. That is how one fights corruption. When we talk of corruption, it is not limited to the people at the top, it is also pervasive at the grassroots level. If we can eradicate corruption from the grassroots, it means we can deal with corruption everywhere.³⁵

Government responsiveness to monitoring occurred across the three local government areas covered by CEWHIN monitors, although responses from state government officials were not always positive. Officials of the HGSFP were very responsive and accommodating, particularly the program manager. According to the CEWHIN executive director:

The personality of the leader is a very critical factor. She is very supportive. I don't think that there was anything we requested for that she has not given approval. She might say, 'let me speak with my people' or 'this is above me, let me talk to the Commissioner.' Sometimes she would say, 'write a letter and direct it to the Commissioner,' and you can be rest assured that the moment she is able to discuss with the Commissioner, they will take up the issue.³⁶

Similarly, the HGSFP program manager described the relationship with CEWHIN, the monitors, and her office as cordial and beneficial. According to her:

The relationship has been very good. Because we have not seen ourselves as witch-hunting one another, I see them as complementing whatever we have been doing. Once they call and furnish us with updates about the program, we are always on our toes ... So their participation in the program has helped the whole system.³⁷

Over time, the relationship and the responses from the local governments also improved considerably. The education secretaries came to consider the monitors as partners, rather than antagonists as at the start of monitoring. One of the education secretaries observed that, "it is a good development that CSOs are involved in the school feeding program, and they are contributing to how to improve the program. We all need to collaborate to make things better."³⁸

According to the CEWHIN executive director, one of the confidence-building mechanisms the organization adopted was to ensure that none of their reports from the field was published or leaked to the media. This was a deliberate approach by CEWHIN to ensure good working relationship with government officials. "We told them that we are not doing it to embarrass the government, rather we are monitoring the school feeding program in order to improve the process."³⁹ Hence all CEWHIN reports went directly to the HGSFP Secretariat.

Monitoring of the HGSFP ultimately proved quite popular among citizens and officials. Community-driven demand led to scale up of the program from three to six local government areas. Monitors also received requests from head teachers at schools not included in the monitoring program to extend their monitoring exercise to their schools. Similarly, education secretaries asked CEWHIN to extend their monitoring to schools not covered in the exercise.

External interest in Ogun's HGSFP also hinted at its perceived successes. During the four-year period that the MacArthur-funded CSOs monitored the program in Ogun State, Botswana and South Africa invited the state implementing team to share their experiences and strategies for success. Similarly, representatives from Kaduna and Ekiti States visited Abeokuta to learn about the Ogun State template in order to replicate it in their states (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021).

CEWHIN's monitoring strategy devoted considerable time to building the capacity of PTAs and SBMCs. According to CEWHIN's program officer:

One of the things that was discovered during the training was that most of the SBMC members did not know their roles and responsibilities. The PTAs were more vibrant [active] than the SBMCs. Most SBMCs don't hold meetings regularly, some don't even know themselves. So, we decided that there is need to strengthen these platforms and not just limit our intervention to monitoring the school feeding. Through one of the monitors, we obtained a copy of SBMC constitution and make copies for all of them. We also decided to work with schools where their SBMCs were not functional to help them develop their capacity to function effectively. The idea was not just to monitor but to ensure that the existing platforms for accountability and transparency are strengthened.⁴⁰

CEWHIN discovered that PTAs were more active because they met regularly, and they were more involved in the administration of their respective schools. On the other hand, most SBMCs were not functioning well, or did not even exist. To strengthen these platforms, CEWHIN introduced capacity building training for them during the accountability forum. According to CEWHIN's program officer:

During the discussion, a lot of accountability issues were raised. For example, there were challenges with the PTA levy that parents contributed. Some PTA members don't know how the money is being spent and for what purpose it was spent. The PTA chairmen said they don't know how much was collected from the pupils, and they don't have access to the enrollment records of pupils in their schools.⁴¹

According to one of the monitors, "CEWHIN helped us to have a better understanding of our roles and responsibilities as PTA and SBMC. We now know that our assignment is more than just coming for the monthly meetings."⁴² Similarly, the chairman of monitors in Yewa South Local Government observed that the training from CEWHIN had helped them as PTA and SBMC members to engage more effectively with the school management in their localities. "We have forced the head teachers to be more transparent in the management of PTA levy and earned more respect from the other parents and teachers."⁴³

CEWHIN's strategy of empowering both the PTAs and SBMCs to be more effective in carrying out their mandates in addition to monitoring the school feeding program shifted the balance of power in favor of the PTAs and SBMCs. According to one of the monitors:

The training we received from CEWHIN has given us the courage to challenge the authority whenever we noticed an error or any malpractices, unlike before when we used to keep quiet. The training has given us courage to speak out and ask questions until we get answers.⁴⁴

Another monitor observed that the training provided by CEWHIN empowered them to demand to know what was going on in their various schools. “Before now we didn’t have access to the school accounts, but when this program started, CEWHIN made us realized that we are the parents who contributed the money; if that’s the case, why shouldn’t we know what’s going on with the school fund?”⁴⁵ As a result of CEWHIN’s monitoring program, members of the PTAs and SBMCs began to see themselves as the conscience of their communities. In fact, they considered monitoring the school feeding program as part of fighting corruption. According to one of the chairmen of the monitors, “what we are doing is part of government anti-corruption campaign because if we are not monitoring the school feeding program, a lot of things would have gone wrong in those schools.”⁴⁶ Some government officials also responded positively to CEWHIN’s strategy of using PTA and SBMC members as monitors. According to one of the education secretaries:

Members of the PTA and SBMCs are now involved in the school system. They know much about what’s going on in the school system now than before. They are now more or less part of us because we rub minds together on how to improve many things.⁴⁷

For CEWHIN, relying on PTAs and SBMCs “empowered people to think through issues of transparency and accountability in all spheres of life and the need for communities to be involved in the education system” (CEWHIN 2019). Members of PTAs and SBMCs were thus empowered as opinion leaders and represented people’s voices in their communities. The community perceived them as the link between government and the people. Furthermore, they became champions in the fight against corruption in their local schools as well as their communities.

The monitoring also created linkages between CEWHIN and other local CSOs through the formation of the Transparency and Accountability Network, a network of CSOs working on transparency and accountability programs in Ogun State. The network was recently registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission as a national body and CEWHIN has been working with them on several programmatic activities. According to the report of the MacArthur Foundation cohort of monitoring grantees, “A key component of the project . . . is the engagements with the communities to drive the process and expected outputs. Communities took part from the beginning of the project and were engaged throughout the project term.... Consequently, the community stakeholders have demonstrated their buy-in into the programme and are willing to ensure its continuity and longevity at the community level” (CEWHIN 2019).

The project also contributed to the promotion of transparency and accountability by bridging the information gap between the community and the government. Those involved felt that it improved awareness among parents, other community members, head teachers, and other stakeholders, particularly through dissemination of findings by the monitors during accountability forums. Those close to the program felt this information sharing created an informed citizenry willing to demand for transparency and accountability and deal with petty corruption, particularly within the school system. They believed the experience of monitoring left citizens better equipped to engage government officials constructively given a better understanding of their rights and responsibilities, and knowledge of how to engage those officials.

Conclusion

In this case, the state actor's actions were enabled by the support provided by MacArthur Foundation to CSOs to monitor the school feeding program. National CSOs collaborated with community-based organizations and seized the opportunity of an opening from above to promote transparency and accountability in the HGSFP. The program manager for the Ogun State HGSFP took tangible actions that provided the 'opening from above' by granting permission to CEWHIN and its partners to monitor the school feeding program in the state. Her action reduced the cost of collective action by granting monitors unrestricted access to schools and head teachers, which would have been impossible without her letter of introduction. The introduction letter conferred official recognition and legitimacy on the monitors, facilitated effective collaboration among critical stakeholders within the school feeding ecosystem, and increased information sharing between those stakeholders.

The opened space was 'occupied' by members of PTAs and SBMCs to monitor school feeding. They used the power and social capital gained to bargain over a whole range of policies and administrative issues in the management of education at the local level. The monitors self-organized themselves at each local government area and elected key officers to manage their affairs. This organization allowed them to quickly mobilize around reported problems and visit implicated schools as a group. As a result, they wielded more power and influence within the community. Any time they went out as a group, they usually wore their uniforms, which were seen as a "symbol of power and authority . . . Once we wear our uniforms, everyone would start saying 'these are the Abuja people,'"⁴⁸ meaning they had the backing of the federal government in the capital city.

The community-led monitoring approach empowered members of the PTAs and SBMCs to think through issues of transparency and accountability holistically and highlighted the need for collective action in the management of education at the local level. The monitors had direct access to the HGSFP Secretariat and education secretaries. They reported their findings to the HGSFP Secretariat for necessary improvements. Through their collective action, there was "significant reduction in the rate of malpractices" observed in the school feeding program. The approach empowered individuals and communities to have a better understanding of corruption and the need to get involved in addressing it, even at the local level. For instance, the monitors extended their efforts to include tracking and utilization of locally-awarded government contracts and projects (CEWHIN 2019). Similarly, PTAs started demanding transparency and accountability from the head teachers in the collection and utilization of PTA fees. Significantly, this exercise helped develop the capacity of members of SBMCs and PTAs.

Although the monitoring of the HGSFP in Ogun State appears to have improved the quality of the program as well as empowered the involved social actors, the effort was short lived. In 2019, the third year of the project, the term-limited governor left office and a new governor took office. Two related events rolled back the activities of the monitors in the state. First, the program manager in Ogun State resigned because she was a political appointee, and a new program manager was appointed. As a result, the relationship the monitors had built with the initial program manager was erased. Transfers of the education secretaries also forced the monitoring CSOs to repeatedly carry out advocacy visits and re-establish relationships with new officials.⁴⁹ At the same time, the

state government terminated the contracts of about seventy percent of the cooks to make room for new cooks connected with politicians in the new administration. The HGSFP was put on hold as these new cooks were trained and resourced to carry out the program (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021). According to the CEWHIN program officer, “the Ogun State government suspended school feeding by December 2019, while other states continued to feed. Reason given was that the new government was trying to settle-down and assess the details of the program.”⁵⁰ This development demotivated some monitors. According to a monitoring team lead, “I must confess to you, I no longer have the excitement to continue. They have messed up everything and the program is no longer what it used to be” (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021, 65).

National changes to the HGSFP also impacted the program in Ogun State. In 2019, the President of Nigeria decided to move the National HGSFP from the office of the Vice President to a newly created Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management, and Social Development. In conjunction with this move, management of the school feeding program shifted from political appointees and private sector experts to core civil servants. In Ogun State, though the HGSFP remained under the Commissioner of Special Duties, the newly appointed program manager was a civil servant. This development meant every decision about the program was subject to often inefficient civil service rules and procedures. By the time the new administration had settled down, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, and everything was shut down. Ogun State stopped feeding its beneficiaries as of December 2019, and did not resume until May 2021, but only then for a brief stint before the school year finished at the end of July (Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme 2021). As a result, for about eighteen months, there was no school feeding or monitoring in the state. Finally, monitoring ceased when the grant from MacArthur ended in 2021.

The introduction and support of citizen monitoring of the school feeding program in Ogun showed the willingness of citizens to take responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the HGSFP as well as to report identified corrupt practices and leakages to government for immediate corrective action. Notwithstanding the successes recorded by this initiative, its sustainability depended heavily on the support of a donor organization, as well as the presence of the reformer who drove the process within government. These factors shortened the timeframe for implementing the reform. And in this case, government and CSOs had to spend some of that time to build and develop a trusting relationship to facilitate monitoring. Although the monitoring program did not survive beyond the end of project funding, the strategy of using existing structures (PTAs and SBMCs) within the education sector, and in so doing further developing their capacity, remains critical to sustaining future citizen monitoring efforts.

Table 1. Interviews and Focus Groups Conducted for Case Study

	Title	Date
Interviews		
1	Executive director, CEWHIN	April 25, 2019
2	Program officers, CEWHIN	April 26, 2019
3	Program manager, Ogun HGSFP	April 29, 2019
4	State operations officer, Ogun HGSFP	April 29, 2019
5	Chairman of monitors, Abeokuta South	April 29, 2019
6	Education secretary, Abeokuta South	April 29, 2019
7	Chairman (alternate) of head teachers	April 29, 2019
8	Chairman of monitors, Odogbolu	April 30, 2019
9	Head teacher, Odogbolu	April 30, 2019
10	Education secretary, Odogbolu	April 30, 2019
11	Chairman of monitors, Yewa South	May 2, 2019
12	Education secretary, Yewa South	May 2, 2019
13	Cook, Yewa South	May 2, 2019
14	Executive director, CEWHIN	February 20, 2020 June 25, 2021
15	Program officer, CEWHIN	June 29, 2021
Focus Groups		
1	Monitors, Abeokuta South	April 29, 2019
2	Monitors, Odogbolu	April 30, 2019
3	Monitors, Yewa South	May 2, 2019

References

- Aregbesola, Rauf. 2016. "The Success Story of Osun Elementary School Feeding and Health Programme (O-MEALS)." State House, Abuja, June 9.
- Centre for Women's Health and Information (CEWHIN). 2017. "To Monitor, Document, and Demand Accountability in the Administration of the Home-Grown School Feeding in Ogun State." Grant Proposal submitted to MacArthur Foundation.
- Centre for Women's Health and Information (CEWHIN). 2018. "May 2018 Newsletter." <https://cewhin.com/publications/CEWHIN%20NEWSLETTER1.pdf>.
- Centre for Women's Health and Information (CEWHIN). 2019. "Home-Grown School Feeding Programme in Nigeria: Increasing Community-Led Transparency and Accountability." Lagos State: MacArthur Foundation.
- "Nigeria Home-Grown School Strategic Plan-2020." 2016. Abuja: Federal Government of Nigeria. <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig169078.pdf>.
- Ogun State Home-Grown School Feeding Programme Cohort of MacArthur Foundation Grantees. 2021. "Promoting Citizen-Led Social Accountability in the Ogun Home-Grown School Feeding Programme: Collaborations, Experiences and Learnings." Lagos, Nigeria: MacArthur Foundation.
- "Report of the first Accountability Forum held with SBMC/PTA monitors across CEWHIN's 3 Project LGAs." July 17, 2018. Ogun State: SBMC/PTA and CEWHIN.

Notes

1 The original states that participated in the HGSFP pilot program: Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory); Bauchi; Cross River; Enugu; Imo; Kano; Kebbi; Kogi; Rivers; Ogun; Osun; Nasarawa; and Yobe

2 Interview #3.

3 Interview #1.

4 Interview #2.

5 Interview #2.

6 Interview #1.

7 Interview #1.

8 Focus group #3.

9 Interview #5.

10 Interview #5.

11 Interview #1.

12 Focus group #2.

13 Interview #11.

14 Focus group #3.

15 Interview #11.

16 Focus group #1.

17 Interview #5.

18 Interview #5.

19 Interview #2.

20 Interview #5.

21 Interview #5.

22 Interview #5.

23 Interview #5.

24 Interview #2.

25 Interview #2.

26 Interview #12.

- 27 Interview #12.
- 28 Interview #1.
- 29 Interview #5.
- 30 Interview #10.
- 31 Interview #12.
- 32 Interview #2.
- 33 Interview #2.
- 34 Interview #6.
- 35 Interview #8.
- 36 Interview #1.
- 37 Interview #3.
- 38 Interview #10.
- 39 Interview #1.
- 40 Interview #2.
- 41 Interview #2.
- 42 Interview #5.
- 43 Interview #11.
- 44 Interview #11.
- 45 Focus group #3.
- 46 Interview #11.
- 47 Interview #10.
- 48 Focus group #3.
- 49 Interview #2.
- 50 Interview #15.

www.accountabilityresearch.org



American University
School of International Service
4400 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, DC 20016
www.accountabilityresearch.org